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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie 
Since 1983, an annual one-day conference on the most significant 
current developments occurring in Indonesia, both political and 
economic, has been held at the Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 
with the title of Indonesia 
Project in the Department 
Political and Social Change. 
Update, under the auspices of the Indonesia 
of Economics and of the Department of 
In 1988 it was decided to publish the papers 
given there for the first time. If the venture proves successful we hope 
that in future it will be worth continuing to do so on a regular basis. 
The format for these seminars has followed the same basic pattern 
each year, beginning in the morning with a survey of the current state 
of the Indonesian economy (which often sets the basic constraints within 
which so many of the policy options available to Indonesia's decision-
makers must be worked out) and then of the main political 
developments of the previous twelve months. The afternoon sessions 
have been more varied, being devoted to a number of papers on a single 
theme, usually selected on the basis of the availability of suitable 
speakers, sometimes on foreign policy, or various aspects of Indonesian-
Australian relations, or aid and demography as in 1987. In 1988 these 
papers dealt with aspects of regional development, which gave rise to an 
unusually interesting and illuminating set of papers and discussions. 
The speaker in the session on the economy is usually someone who 
has recently written the 'Survey of Recent Developments' for the 
Bulletin of Economic Studies (BIES), published by the Indonesia Project. 
A much fuller and more comprehensive treatment of the issues raised in 
that session can be found in one of the latest issues of the BIES, as on 
this occasion when the paper presented by Chris Manning was based 
upon the survey he and Sisira Jayasuriya wrote for the August 1988 
issue. While there is inevitably some overlap between the two pieces, 
the paper is a highly condensed version of the original survey, although 
in this case a most illuminatil\g and readable one. 
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Appropriately qualified discussants are usually invited to comment 
briefly on the main papers and introduce the public discussion on them. 
In 1988 we were fortunate to have as commentator on the politics side, 
Dr Arief Budiman, one of Indonesia's foremost social scientists from 
Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, who is currently the George Hicks 
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies at Monash 
University. The discussant on the economics side was Emeritus 
Professor H.W. Arndt, the founder of the Indonesia Project and of the 
BIES, who has played a major part in the development of Southeast 
Asian studies within the ANU. He and Professor Benjamin Higgins, one 
of the first 'old Indonesia hands' from North America and one of the 
founders of the State Planning Bureau in Jakarta in the early 1950s, led 
off the discussion on regional economies also. 
The papers included here on the regional economies are based on a 
series of much longer studies of all the provincial economies of 
Indonesia, bar one, that were initially presented at a closed conference 
on that topic held at the ANU in February 1987. These will shortly be 
published by Oxford University Press, Singapore, under the title, Unity 
and Diversity: Regional Economic Development in Indonesia since 1970, 
edited by Hal Hill. A much fuller monograph version of Chris Manning's 
unusually authoritative account of the economy of Irian Jaya will also be 
published shortly by the National Centre for Development Studies at the 
ANU, as Economic Development, Migrant Labour and Indigenous Welfare 
in lrian Jaya, 1970-1984. This is a subject on which reliable information 
has been extremely hard to obtain ever since the publication in 197 4 of 
Garnaut and Manning, lrian Jaya: the Transformation of a Melanesian 
Economy. Manning's paper in this collection, while longer than the 
others, is an unusually valuable piece and we are proud to have the 
opportunity to include it here, as also the contributions of the other 
participants in the regional economies series, whom we 
willing cooperation in this venture. 
thank for their 
We are grateful to Liz Drysdale for organizing the Conference, Alex 
Bellis for overseeing editorial production of this monograph for 
publication, and to Bev Fraser, Marlene Arney and Claire Smith for their 
parts in typing it. 
Chapter 2 
THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 1987-88* 
Chris Manning 
By far the most important development in the Indonesian economy 
in 1987-88 has been the continued strong and quite astonishing growth 
of non-oil exports, especially of manufactured goods. If the trends of 
the first half of 1988 continue, the non-oil group will surpass oil and 
gas exports for the first time in the past twenty years, and manufactures 
will account for over half of the non-oil group . Non-oil exports grew by 
just under 30 per cent in 1987 and in the first six months of 1988 by 
close to 50 per cent. The growth of manufacturing exports has been 
equally impressive. This is quite an amazing performance, particularly 
in view of the very slow growth that occurred from 1978 onwards, 
when Indonesia first undertook a major devaluation in an attempt to 
stimulate non-oil exports and to some extent insulate them from the 
'Dutch-disease' effects of the oil boom. 
In this paper I will examine the implications of this growth, the 
overall pattern of expansion , policies and external factors which have 
contributed to it, both for short-term economic stability and for 
medium-term economic growth, incomes and employment. I will argue 
that the recent developments on the export front suggest that Indonesia 
is well on track to overcoming the current balance of payments and 
budgetary crisis. This crisis was brought on by the continuing real 
decline in oil prices since 1981 and by a potential crisis that was 
intensified by the emergence of major debt servicing problems, 
precipitated by the yen revaluation in 1985 and 1986. 
The non-oil export boom has also made a significant contribution to 
GDP growth in a period of slow agricultural growth and uncertain oil 
prices. But this success has been achieved at considerable cost in terms 
• For a fuller discussion of several of these points see Sisira Jayasuriya and Chris 
Manning , Survey of Recent Developments, BIES, 24(2), 1988, p. 3-44. 
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of wage and income growth. Maintenance of current trends will depend 
considerably on continuation of deflationary policies which are likely to 
continue to hurt the middle class, wage-earners and the self-employed. 
In the interests of economic stability and short-term growth, and 
perhaps also medium-term growth, it would appear that Indonesia has 
no choice but to push on with the export-oriented strategy. But it has 
clearly not been, and will not be, a frictionless process. 
Macroeconomic performance 
In the past few years GDP growth has been modest, certainly by 
Southeast Asian and NIC standards, in both 1986 and 1987, at about 3.6 
to 3.7 per cent (Table 2.1) . In 1988 people are beginning to revise 
exceed 4 per cent. 
by the s 1 u g g is h 
projections, suggesting that growth might marginally 
Overall growth has been held back particularly 
agricultural sector, output of which declined in 1987. 
here has been the decline in the growth rate in rice 
averaged just 1.6 per cent over the last 3 years. 
The major factor 
output, which has 
This is in marked 
contrast to the rapid growth in rice production up to the mid 1980s, 
when Indonesia achieved rice self-sufficiency. 
TABLE 2.1: Indicators of Economic Performance 
1986 1987 
(estimates) 
Real Growth Rates 
GDP 3.6 3.7 
Non-oil GDP 3.8 4.3 
Agriculture 2.5 2.3 
Mining 4.0 3.1 
Manufacturing 6.3 6.9 
Construction 2.2 5.6 
Other services 4 .3 4.9 
National income -2.5 4 .2 
Non-oil exports 2.8 24.2 
Non-oil imports -12.4 0.8 
Terms of Trade (1983/84 100) 62 .6 69 .2 
Inflation (% change) 9.1 9.3 
Source: Sisira Jayasuriya and Chris Manning, 'Survey of Recent Developments', 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 24 (2), 1988, p.8. 
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International factors have played an important role in the recent 
growth performance, through the marked improvement in the terms of 
trade associated with the commodity boom. 
continued at about 8 to 9 per cent. 
The rate of inflation has 
The key development in the balance of payments has been the 
emergence of a significant debt service problem, with the ratio now 
approximately 40 per cent and projected to remain at about that level 
through to at least 1990. As mentioned, the most significant factor in 
the blow-out of the Indonesian debt was the revaluation of the yen. A 
large proportion of Indonesia's debt was denominated in yen, thus 
contributing to the very substantial growth in the debt service ratio in 
the period 1984-86. The ratio stabilised somewhat in 1987; it has risen 
again slightly in 1988, and is likely to remain high until 1990 before a 
projected 'plateauing off'. 
A final point is the resurgence of both domestic and foreign 
investment, which is being directed primarily towards export-oriented 
projects . This suggests that the deregulation measures that the 
Indonesian government put in place since the early 1980s have begun 
to have an effect. 
The non-oil export boom 
Figure 2.1 indicates trends in exports. There was a very substantial 
growth during the second oil boom period, plateauing off in 1982, and 
declining sharply in 1986, with the plummeting oil prices. This was 
followed by substantial growth in 1987 and, if current trends continue, 
the total will reach about $20 billion in 1988. This is a very substantial 
pick-up, considering that the economy was in deep recession in 1986. 
One of the most interesting features of the recent performance is the 
substantial increase in the proportion of non-oil and gas 
accounting for over half of Indonesia's total exports and 
dominant role that oil has played in exports (Table 2.2) .1 
exports, now 
displacing the 
It should be mentioned, how~ver, that these data do not accurately reflect 
annual trends, in 1987 in particular, when non-oil and oil exports picked up 
considerably in the second half of the year. 
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FIGURE 2.1: Indonesia's Export Earnings, 1974-87 
Billions of dollars 
25 
'7~ '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 
• From oil and liquefied natural gas 
0 From non-oil commodities 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1987, and Bank of Indonesia 
Weekly Report, May 13, 1988. 
TABLE 2.2: Indonesian Export Growth 1985-1988 (January-June) 
Oil and Gas 
Oil 
Gas 
Non-Oil/Gas 
Total 
• January to May 
1985-86 
-25 
-30 
-14 
5 
-15 
% Change 
1986-87 1987-88 
-7 
3 
-25 
14 
2 
7 
o• 
33• 
47 
26 
% Distribution 
1985 
66 
45 
21 
34 
100 
1988* 
46 
31 
15 
54 
100 
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1988; and Bank of Indonesia, 
Laporan Mingguan, 13 May 1988. 
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One other point to be noted from this table is that the decline in the 
oil price has not had as severe an effect on the overall oil-gas component 
as is often thought. Natural gas exports have been growing very rapidly. 
Hence the oil-gas component has held up quite well, despite the 
plateauing of the oil exports since 1986; this may continue to 
compensate for the very substantial decline in oil prices that the world 
is now experiencing. 
Three points are important in the compos1t1on of non-oil exports. 
The first is the predominance of agricultural based exports , both 
primary products and processed agricultural commodities. Contributing 
about 60 per cent of the total, these are dominated by plywood and 
other processed timber (Table 2.3 ). 
The second major point is the concentration of exports in two major 
commodities textiles and timber products which account for 
approximately two-thirds of non-oil exports, and 85 per cent of the 
increment in 1986-87. These shares have continued in 1988. 
Nevertheless, despite this concentration in a small number of 
commodities, the third feature is a relatively broad-based growth in a 
wide range of products, both labour-intensive products, processed 
rubber, tyres, rubber gloves, handicrafts, food and animal products, and 
also a range of capital-intensive products, fertiliser, cement, machinery 
and electrical appliances. The composition of the 'other' manufacturing 
commodities group shown in Table 2.4 gives some idea of growth in 
1987 of a range of manufacturing exports outside the dominant textile 
and plywood groups. 
What has contributed to this very rapid growth? There are both 
optimistic and less optimistic interpretations. 
series of deregulation measures which were 
The first would stress a 
put in place since 1983 
aimed at removing bureaucratic controls in business 
the foreign trade regime, reform of customs, 
activity, freeing up 
reducing non-tariff 
barriers to trade, and encouraging investment 
through streamlining access to credit. The 
in export 
growth in 
industries 
textiles and 
garments and a range of medium-scale export firms is seen as evidence 
of progress made through deregulation. 
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TABLE 2.3: The Composition of Non-Oil Exports 
Y12lum~ ('QQQ 1!2D) Yalu~ (Sm) 
1986 1987 % Change 1986 1987 % Change 
Agricultural Products 
Timber 5100 6326 24 1419 2210 56 
Rubber 1047 1168 12 720 961 33 
Coffee 310 292 -6 830 526 -37 
Palm oil 536 611 14 103 169 64 
Shrimp 55 86 56 289 354 22 
Other animal products 66 87 32 59 88 49 
Tea 90 93 3 101 111 10 
Tobacco 25 28 12 72 65 - 10 
Tap ioca 427 790 85 49 89 82 
Other food products 616 1100 79 95 92 -3 
Pepper 31 33 3 140 148 5 
Other spices 60 55 -8 73 93 27 
Copra cakes 380 319 -16 35 33 -6 
Rattan 114 126 11 96 142 48 
Minerals 
Tin 24 22 -8 181 139 -23 
Copper 304 253 -17 158 154 -3 
Nickel matte 49 46 -6 98 115 17 
Other minerals 4368 3205 -27 282 284 
Manufactures 
Textiles and products 140 164 17 683 874 28 
Handicrafts 78 58 -26 175 233 33 
Electrical appliances 9 12 33 98 57 -41 
Fertiliser 1498 1018 -32 123 87 -29 
Cement 1750 2202 26 41 52 27 
Other 797 1402 76 
Total 6626 8430 27 
Source: Sisera Jayasuriya and Chris Manning, 'Survey of Recent Developments' , 
BIES, 24 (2), 1988, p. 18. 
i 
~=-------------=----------------------~~~~ ~-i 
TABLE 2.4: Major Items Within 'Other' Manufactured Exports 
(US$ million at current prices) 
Product 
Non-ferrous metal products 
Food and animal products 
Industrial products from raw material 
Iron and steel 
Chemical products 
Paper products 
Fertiliser 
Other appliances 
Vegetable and animal oil products 
Cement 
Electrical appliances 
Tyres 
Tobacco products 
TOTAL 
April-November 
1986 
229.0 
190.4 
153.2 
39.7 
80.l 
24.0 
97.0 
32.5 
26.3 
28.7 
9.5 
7.6 
4.3 
922.3 
April-November 
1987 
294.8 
243.9 
233.1 
145.5 
110.9 
74.4 
73.1 
45.4 
41.4 
39.l 
17. l 
17.0 
10.4 
1,346. l 
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Source: Sisera Jayasuriya and Chris Manning, 'Survey of Recent Developments', 
Bl ES, 24 (2), 1988, p. 19. 
A less favourable interpretation would stress the direct role of 
government intervention in stimulating non-oil export growth. This 
includes the ban on log exports which facilitated the very substantial 
growth of plywood, controls on the export of a range of timber products 
(most recently rattan), and the export of relatively capital-intensive 
products supported by heavy public sector investment and preferential 
credit. The latter include fertiliser, cement, and heavily subsidised 
metal product exports from Krakatau Steel as prime examples. 
Both processes have been important, but it is necessary to stress 
that, underlying the export boom, there certainly has not been a 
decisive move towards freeing up market forces. 
A second set of factors that has been very significant in overall 
export growth has been shifts in relative prices induced by domestic 
policies and international circumstances. The 1986 devaluation in 
particular has played a crucial role in that it has 'stuck' in terms of 
maintenance of the real exchange rate through a control of domestic 
prices and a gradual depreciation of the rupiah. This is a major 
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departure from the experience of similar devaluations both in 1978 and 
the 1983 devaluation where, especially in the former, domestic price 
growth largely eroded the price effects of devaluation in a few years. 
Another important development has been the international commodity 
price boom in the period 1986 to 1988, supported by strong demand 
growth in Indonesia's major export markets. 
Incomes and wages 
The maintenance of a real devaluation in the order of 30 per cent 
could be achieved only through a considerable downward pressure on 
wages and incomes. This indeed appears to have been the case in the 
private sector, in rice, other agricultural products and in construction, 
and in the public sector through the freeze on public servants' salaries 
since 1985. Downward pressure had already been exerted during the 
recession from about 1983-84 onwards, as evidenced in nominal and 
real wage growth in the estate sector (Figure 2.2). 
FIGURE 2.2: Nominal and Real Wage, and CPI Growth, Estate Sector, 
Indonesia 1976177 - 1985186 
% Growth per 
annum 
25 
10 
5 
0 _____ ......_ ___ .... 
1976/77-
1979/80 
1979/80-
1982/83 
1982/83-
1985/86 
Nominal Wages 
CPI 
Real Wages 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Rata-Rata Upah Pekerja Perkebunan, various 
years. 
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Although data are limited, an increase in the proportion of self-
employed in urban areas suggests probably that there has been a 
considerable flow-on from depressed spending to incomes in the 
informal sector. It needs to be noted that export growth has really not 
been sufficiently large to affect labour demand significantly, mainly 
because of the relatively small size of the overall non-oil -export sector. 
The other factor of considerable importance has been the slow growth in 
agriculture, and especially rice, the single most important employer of 
labour in the economy. This has ensured that labour supply pressures 
have begun to play a much more important role in holding back wage 
growth. 
One of the most remarkable features of labour market adjustments 
has been the lack of significant urban unrest, especially among the 
middle class and wage earners in large and medium-scale enterprises, as 
a consequence of the squeeze. The question arises as to whether this 
relatively stable situation will continue during the next few years if the 
government is forced to maintain its deflationary policies. 
Conclusion 
It is useful to conclude by assessing some of the conditions 
suggested recently by Jakarta economists as prerequisites for continued 
non-oil export growth, aimed particularly at easing the balance of 
payments and debt service problems. Apart from international 
developments - and these look fairly bright, certainly in the next year -
there are two broad areas in which action is seen as crucial to continued 
growth. 
The first is the maintenance of the momentum towards 
deregulation. Most important is the mooted reform of the banking 
system, including removal of some of the constraints over operation of 
domestic private banks and foreign banks with the major aim of 
reducing transaction costs and the very high lending rates - real interest 
rates approached 20 per cent in mid-1988. Further deregulation of the 
trade regime is also seen as important for overall economic efficiency, in 
particular the removal of some of the monopoly import controls; once 
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again the case of plastics and other commodities has been highlighted in . 
the press in recent months. One worrying development has been the 
delay in announcement of the major package of monetary reform, which 
was reportedly in place in April this year. Some people have suggested 
that the approach of the new Finance Minister, Radius Prawiro, 
ostensibly more of a politician than his predecessor, has contributed to a 
slowing down of this deregulation process. 
The second issue, in a sense in conflict with the first, is control of 
inflation. It has been fairly widely argued in the Indonesian press in 
recent months that Indonesia must reduce the rate of inflation below 8-
9 per cent to closer to 5 per cent. This is seen as crucial to enabling 
Indonesia to maintain international competitiveness. The achievement 
of lower inflation will require continuation of tight fiscal and monetary 
policy. The latter will anyway, to some extent, be forced by the very 
recent and probably continuing decline in oil prices in the immediate 
future at least. Continued export growth may require further belt-
tightening and a key question is whether this will be acceptable 
politically over the next few years. 
Chapter 3 
INDONESIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1987-88 
Jamie Mackie 
Apart from the death .of the Sultan of Yogyakarta on 2 October 19 8 8, 
an event of considerable symbolic 
importance in the short term, four 
have arisen in Indonesia during 
elections in May 1987. Three 
significance but no great political 
topics of broader political interest 
1987-88, since the last national 
of these have been relatively 
straightforward matters, whereas the other is a puzzling non-event, 
something that did not happen, analogous to the famous case of Sherlock 
Holmes' dog that did not bark in the night. The puzzle was, quite simply: 
why not? 
The three major developments, on which I will say more in due 
course, have been -
• the March 1988 session of the MPR (Maje/is Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat - Peoples Consultative Assembly), involving the reelection 
of President Suharto, the choice of Sudharmono as Vice President 
and the subsequent announcement of a new cabinet; 
• significant changes in the Armed Forces leadership and in the 
reformulation of the doctrine of dwifungsi; 
• a change of leadership in Golkar at its third national conference 
(Munas Ill) in October from Sudharmono to former Lt. Gen. 
Wahono after a set of regional conferences to choose delegates to 
Munas in which the Armed Forces (ABRI) took over effective 
control of Golkar from the previously civilian leaders. 
More interesting than the detail of these events, however, is the way 
various political developments of 1988 illuminated the ways in which 
the New Order political system is changing, particularly as the question 
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of who will succeed President Suharto becomes a more salient political 
issue. 
The fourth topic of interest, the non-event I have referred to, is the 
fact that the political scene has been amazingly unruffled and outwardly 
calm over the last twelve months or so, considering that the country is · 
now in its third year of very slow growth, declining real incomes for 
many people, and the most severe economic difficulties it has suffered 
in nearly twenty years. Public service salaries were frozen in this year's 
budget for the third time, unemployment rates are rising, inflation has 
been running at about 8-9 per cent per annum over the last three years, 
while the real value of the Rupiah against other currencies has declined 
by about 50 per cent since mid-198.6, resulting in much higher Rupiah 
costs for imported goods (Jayasuriya and Manning 1988:39, 16). Yet 
there has been remarkably little public protest about any of this, very 
little rhetoric of the conventional economic-nationalist kind against the 
deregulatory, market-oriented economic policies of the technocrats, who 
seem still to be making the major economic decisions (as they usually do 
when times are bad), and fewer manifestations of Islamic discontent 
than we saw in the early 1980s, when the economy was booming. 
Explaining 'stability' 
How are we to explain this apparent acquiescence to policies (and 
the government responsible for them) which must be hurting so many 
people via the hip-pocket nerve, in particular, the middle classes and 
fixed-salary earners, but 
lagging well behind price 
not only them? Workers' wages have been 
increases . Businessmen have been suffering 
increasingly from the economic contraction of the last two or three 
years, although companies associated with close relatives of top 
government leaders are benefitting from the notorious import 
monopolies over essential materials like plastics and tin-plate, which are 
key factors behind the so-called 'high cost economy'. But even the 
voices of businessmen have been surprisingly muted on that issue. In 
fact, as Jayasuriya and Manning (1988:7) recently observed: 
! 
. 
I 
favourable external developments have helped to strengthen 
the general mood of cautious optimism that appears to prevail 
in the foreign exchange markets and the wider business 
community. First . . . substantial [IGGI] assistance . . has been 
forthcoming. Second a significant decline in the current account 
deficit [in 1987) has raised hopes that an end to the severe 
external sector imbalances may be in sight. Thirdly, the 
announcement of further deregulation measures in the Pakdes 
package [December 1987 deregulatory measures] suggests that 
the momentum of deregulation will not run out of steam. 
Fourthly, despite the underlying political tensions exposed 
during the election of the Vice President, the political climate 
appears quite stable. 
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Why the situation remains so stable despite the difficulties of the 
last few years is quite a puzzling phenomenon. It could be for any one 
of several reasons, or a combination of them: 
a/ Because the authoritarian and repressive character of the 
regime makes it dangerous and frightening for people to speak out 
on such matters, so everyone is keeping silent on contentious 
matters, either voluntarily or because of coercion. There is 
doubtless some truth in this, but it surely cannot be more than a 
minor element in the story, since people have often protested 
boldly in the past, when conditions were hardly more difficult than 
today and the regime was no less repressive. 
b/ Because there is not really much serious dissatisfaction with the 
government's performance on the economic front, since many 
people are aware that they are still better off than they were ten or 
fifteen years ago. It is hard to believe that this is the explanation, 
even though the government has notched up some quite impressive 
achievements in various respects; but there may be something in it, 
although it is far less than the whole story. 
c/ Because the better-informed Indonesians are aware that things 
could have been a lot worse after the 1986 collapse of oil prices, 
that the government's handling of the 1986-88 crisis has been 
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relatively successful in such difficult circumstances, much better 
than in most other countries, and that things now seem to be on 
the mend, particularly on the all-important non-oil export front. · 
There may be some truth in that assertion, but to accept it at face 
value presupposes a good deal of sophistication amongst the 
common people. 
di Because people despair of being able to do anything about such 
matters, either from sheer fatalism or because they do not believe 
it is worth paying the penalties incurred as the price of overt 
dissent in the slim hope that their protests will be heard by the 
relevant authorities. Or because they have been so conditioned and 
indoctrinated into just accepting what the authorities demand of 
them - students and younger people in particular, who have been 
socialised towards conformity rather than dissent since the mid -
1970s - that they no longer dare to step out of line. Again, perhaps 
there is something of that kind to it all, but that can be by no 
means the main part of the explanation. People have paid the 
penalties for protesting in Indonesia at other times, on less hurtful 
issues, so why not now ? Perhaps there is a kind of millenarian 
hope in the air that things are going to start improving again soon, 
or won't go on getting worse, for President Suharto has confounded 
his critics many times in the past. 
All these considerations have probably played some part in varying 
degrees - and there may be others to be added to the list, also. But it is 
still puzzling. 
Three comparisons 1978, 1983 and 1988 
It is illuminating to compare the political situation in March this 
year and the prospects for the years ahead with the situation that 
prevailed five years ago, when the MPR last met in 1983 to elect 
President Suharto and a new Vice President, Lt. Gen. Umar 
Wirahadikusuma. That was an extremely bland occasion, for Suharto 
was then unrivalled at the apex of the political system, as he still is 
today; so interest focussed mainly on his choice of Vice President, which 
proved to be uncontroversial even though quite unexpected. It was 
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uncontroversial because very little political significance was attached to 
the choice he made at that time. None of the men immediately 
surrounding the President then had any substantial power base 
independent of him or were in any position to challenge him - nor did 
they have strong motives to do so. In 1988, his choice of Vice President 
was to prove far more problematic (although perhaps less so than Mr 
Bush's choice of Mr Quayle!), since the President is now reaching an age 
(67) at which his health and longevity between now and 1993 can no 
longer be taken entirely for granted. Hence the choice of Vice President 
has become a crucial factor in what can be called the 'succession politics' 
that are likely to dominate the political scene in Jakarta over the next 
few years, until a clear front-runner for the succession has emerged. 
It is also worth carrying our comparison back further to the very 
different scene five years earlier, at the 1978 MPR session, which took 
place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty after several months of 
extraordinary tension and popular protest, marked by rowdy student 
demonstrations, which at times seemed likely to get out of hand. They 
reportedly gave rise to deep reservations within the Armed Forces high 
command about the advisability of nominating President Suharto for 
another term because of that popular discontent. There has been 
nothing remotely comparable this year to all that sturm und drang of 
1978, even though there is again much discontent about the business 
activities of the President's children (on which more below) and intense 
speculation about the rivalry between State Secretary Sudharmono and 
General L.B. Moerdani for the position of Vice President. The military 
opposition to Sudharmono was made abundantly clear and expressed in 
a nastily insidious way in the form of allegations about his alleged pro-
communist sympathies in the past; moreover, various tough measures 
were taken on the ground that PKI elements are still a threat to 
security. But the calm surface of the MPR session was disturbed only 
momentarily when a maverick colonel disrupted the proceedings at one 
point to protest the nomination of Sudharmono as Vice President on 
behalf of the ABRI faction - until he was hurriedly silenced and pushed 
out of sight. Otherwise, there were no great surprises. And that one 
gesture can hardly be ranked as a very significant expression of 
opposition to the present government, at a time when massive uprisings 
have been occurring against ·authoritarian governments in South Korea 
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and Burma and big changes taking place in state-society relations in 
China, Taiwan and Thailand. 
The political situation in 1987-88 has been significantly different 
from that of 1982-83 in several respects. First, President Suharto was 
then very clearly the pre-eminent figure on the stage, having edged 
aside all possible challengers to his authority, from within the Armed 
Forces or elsewhere, over the previous few years; his chief aides like 
Sudharmono and General Moerdani were then not yet in any position to 
play major political roles independently of him. That is far less clearly 
the case today, for the succession question is much more to the 
forefront. It is also giving rise to a great deal of manoeuvring amongst 
the president's chief lieutenants for ·favourable positions in that race, in 
a way that is already making them harder for him to control, except by 
manipulating them within a curiously complex form of balance-of-
power politics. The succession issue is also adding an element of 
volatility to the political scene that was not present five years ago, when 
the almost forgotten and politically insignificant Lt. Gen. Umar was 
brought in to fill the Vice Presidential slot. 
Neither Sudharmono nor Moerdani can today be dismissed as 
politically insignificant in the way that Umar could be, although it 
remains to be seen what degree of effective power either will be able to 
command independently of his backing by the President if 
circumstances change at all radically. Moreover, General Try Sutrisno is 
now widely regarded as the putative 'Crown Prince', if the succession 
were to become an issue over the next few years, although he has a 
very different set of interests from theirs and potentially a much more 
prom1s10g future ahead of him. A third new factor, however, is the 
rapidly expanding business interests of the President's children and the 
political implications they are likely to have on both the court politics 
being played out in Jakarta, as well as on broader state-society 
relationships. So the political ball-game has changed a great deal since 
1983, although there is no question that the President is still very much 
in control of it all, still unchallenged personally and still the ultimate 
authority laying down the main lines of state policy, in consultation with 
the ministers who advise him and who are responsible for the 
implementation of the policies hammered out at the top. 
1 
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Court politics and elite business interests 
Court politics is usually a depressingly trivial and hot-house subject, 
made up largely of rumours and gossip, based on each participant's 
ability to display signs of having good access to the President and 
influence with him (such as Ir. Habibie is frequently said to have in 
greater degree than anyone, although he is a bit of a loner in terms of 
bureaucratic politics). But court politics has a compelling logic of its own 
which cannot be disregarded in circumstances like the present, when all 
the rivals for influence in the succession stakes must try to remain 
constantly well positioned in the race, since no one can ever be sure just 
when it is going to end. Hence their positioning at that decisive moment 
may prove to be critically important. Factional rivalries are not in 
themselves especially interesting or important so long as they are 
confined to 'court' circles, without links to wider societal groupings, and 
are easily controllable by the President; in fact, his ability to manipulate 
them against one another is one of his safest means of exercising control 
over them. 
Yet such rivalries can become dangerous when any members of the 
court circle are tempted to reach out and try to bid for popular support 
beyond that charmed circle. Ever since the Malari incident of 1974, 
when Generals Sumitro and Ali Moertopo were trying to reach out in 
that way towards broader societal groupings, one of the ground rules of 
Jakarta politics has been that ambitions in that direction are not 
permissible. It has been fairly easy to maintain that ground rule since 
then because of the abundant patrimonialist powers of the government. 
But it may not be so easy to go on doing so if 'the politics of hard times' 
and the looming prospect of President Suharto's departure from centre 
stage begins to make non-court participants in political processes (such 
as they are) more desperate to maintain or increase their power bases 
outside the immediate court circle or the Armed Forces. 
I will say more about the succession issue in a moment. But first I 
must add something about the other new element in Jakarta politics in 
1987-8 that was not nearly as significant a few years ago, but which has 
flared into prominence since about 1985-86. That is, the high-profile 
activities of President Suharto's children in the business world - or what 
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is often referred to in Jakarta gossip as the Tosiba factorl, most notably 
PT Bimantara1 Citra, the very large conglomerate owned by Bambang -
and their links with Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan. (Sudharmono's son 
has also become very prominent recently and lbnu Sutowo's son has 
been so for many years; it is not just the President's children but the 
family busine.ss interests of several leading figures in or close to the 
government w.hich are attracting adverse attention from their less well-
connected competitors.) One heard fewer complaints about the Suharto 
family's business dealings during the boom phase of commercial 
expansion in . Indonesia, prior to about 1984-85; but since the down-turn 
around that time his children have been buying up more and more of 
the most lucrative businesses, at a time when nearly everyone else is 
hurting badly. 'If you have builf a successful business, you have to 
worry that one of the kids will send someone to buy up the shares', said 
a Jakarta retailer to Raymond Bonner earlier this year (1988:81). 
Another of his informants posed the question: 'When is enough 
enough?'. Bonner alleges that the matter of the children's business 
activities was . raised at a meeting of senior ABRI officers in Bandung last 
year and they were told bluntly to drop the subject, all papers on the 
subject being shredded. 
How much of all that is sheer gossip and how much is factually 
accurate is, of course, unknowable, but the politically significant aspect 
of it is that it has all become such a common part of Jakarta gossip - and 
no longer just Jakarta, for one hears stories about it throughout the 
country with the result that the family's business dealings now 
constitute th'e vulnerable Achilles heel of the Suharto regime, which 
could easily. be attacked in appropriate circumstances by anyone 
disposed to discredit either the President or his family. Four or five 
years ago that was barely the case, despite the known business interests 
of Ibu Tien and the close association of Liem Sioe Liong with the entire 
family in its . various business dealings, ever since the 1950s. It is now, 
in my view, the wild card in the pack, a card which cannot be played so 
long as President Suharto has complete control over the way the cards 
are dealt out; but which could prove a devastating trump card against 
him or the family if he ever loses that control even momentarily. 
Tosiba - an acronym made up from the names of the President's sons, Tommy. 
Sigit and Bambang. 
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The family has made itself highly unpopular in the very circles that 
have hitherto been .amongst his strongest supporters, the businessmen 
and urban middle classes of Jakarta and the major cities, both pribumi 
and ethnic Chinese (and to a considerable extent foreign investors, too), 
who have been the major beneficiaries from the 'economic miracle' the 
Suharto regime wrought in its first de.cade or so in power. It is almost 
incomprehensible that the President has allowed a . situation to develop 
in the 1980s where he is putting at risk his historical reputatioQ as the 
'Bapak Pembangunan' (Father of Development) who transformed 
Indonesia from an economic shambles into a remarkable success story, 
just because he . is unwilling or unable to curb the business activities of 
his children. The Armed Forces leadership cannot be unaware of the 
dangers posed to their reputations and potential for future leadership if 
they get to be blamed for failing to exert any pressure on th.is front. Yet 
it is hard to , imagine how an officer like Try Sutrisno who has been so 
closely associated with the President as his personal aide (or Col. 
Prabowo of Kopsus, who is his son-in-law) could pos.sibly take the lead 
in any public way in dissociating the Armed Forces from him and the 
family . In short, this is an issue on which the President and the. ABRI 
leadership could find their interests increasingly divergent over the 
next few years, unless he can rein in his children, which according to the 
rumour circuit he has neither the inclination nor the capacity to do. 
Some commentators have even suggested that dynastic ambitions may 
be playing some part in his or their thinking, but I find it hard to take 
such suggestions seriously in the current circumstances. 
it is all a very puzzling phenomenon. 
But once again, 
The succession issue: regime change, regime character? 
In a recent article on 'The Succession in Indonesia', Harold Crouch 
has posed the question: 
Will Soeharto's political system survive its founder, or will the 
passing of Soeharto see the passing, or at least major 
modification, of the system? (Crouch 1988). 
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That depends, he observed, on the circumstances and timing of the 
transition. Will it be this year, or in five or ten years? Will he resign 
voluntarily, or be forced out? Will the succession occur at a time of 
tranquillity and economic expansion or of crisis, be it economic or 
political, domestic or international? The prospects for a smooth 
succession will be best, argues Crouch, if President Suharto remains in 
office until the end of his current term (1993), by which time General 
Try Sutrisno (or perhaps some other officer) will have had sufficient 
opportunity to establish his authority and credentials as the leading 
candidate for the succession. But if Suharto were to die before Try or a 
successor has been able to consolidate his hold over the Armed Forces 
securely, the chances of a smooth succe.ssion may be low, especially if 
there is a struggle for power between ABRI and Sudharmono (or any 
other contenders from within the Armed Forces, not yet prominent on 
the political stage), with Moerdani trying to play the role of king-maker, 
and ea~ beholden to various centres of factional support. The 
prospects of a smooth transition could also be reduced if an economic 
recovery from the 1986 oil-price set-back cannot be achieved soon, for 
the political stability achieved by the Suharto regime in the l 970-80s 
has depended in large part on the abundance of financial resources 
produced by the oil boom. If the transition to a post-Suharto regime 
occurs at a time when funds are scarce, argues Crouch, it is conceivable 
that the new President might be: 
less able to assert his authority over groups which feel no 
particular sense of loyalty to him. It is possible that in such 
circumstances a weak President, holding office on the 
sufferance of competing military factionalism, would be 
vulnerable to moves by dissatisfied military groups which 
might even attempt to depose him ... (Crouch 1988). 
Military factionalism of that sort does not currently appear to be as 
serious a problem as it had been in earlier decades, but it could 
conceivably re-emerge in embryonic form along different lines from its 
previous manifestations. Crouch goes on to consider various short-term 
and long-term scenarios and possibilities which I will not elaborate here. 
But it is worth noting his conclusion that because of the post-1986 fall in 
oil prices, various socio-economic changes are now occurring which 
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'seemed very unlikely' in the past and which might now have important 
political consequences. Yet even if such consequences do occur, he 
believes they will be confined within the context of military domination, 
and 'not likely to lead to the regime's collapse', or to major changes in its 
character, presumably, since the military will still be the dominant 
political force in one form or another. 
One would be hesitant to disagree with that conclusion - although it 
begs a key question about what the basic character of 'the regime' or 
'the system' really is, or what we might realistically expect it to be 
changing from or to. Is the New· Order regime any longer just a 
military-dominated system of government based upon the 
institutionalised power of the Armed Forces, or is it an essentially 
pe rsonalis tic power structure based upon Suharto's quite unique 
individual authority, as I am inclined to think it now is - or a bit of both, 
or essentially something else entirely? Liddle advanced a persuasive 
case in favour of the institutionalisation hypothesis a few years ago, 
suggesting 'a close link between institutionalisation and policy 
continuity' along with the paradox of 'strong 'presidential leadership and 
policy continuity'; but he may have underestimated the extent to which 
President Suharto's power has become highly personalised over the last 
decade. The Armed Forces and the President do not today have quite 
the same institutional or structural interests as they did in the earlier 
years of the New Order, I would argue, and the military leadership is not 
currently in a strong position to impose its collective will (whatever that 
is) upon him on such a crucial matter as his family's business interests. 
Whether or not we call it a militaristic regime is in part just a matter of 
names and labels, although these are not unimportant. The Suharto 
regime has been characterised at various times over the past fifteen 
years as a military dictatorship, a case of bureaucratic authoritarianism 
in the O'Donnell-Schmitter sense, as a corporatist state, as patrimonialist, 
as a bureaucratic polity a la Fred Riggs' account of Thailand, as a 
'repressive developmentalist regime', and by others as a relatively 
pluralistic form of bureaucratic polity. All these terms have something 
to be said for them, but also quite a lot to be said against them - not 
least the fact that they are in some cases incompatible with each other, 
or at least emphasise divergent, rather than convergent characteristics, 
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pointing in quite different directions or at different features of the 
political landscape. 
One reason for the difficulty in labelling the regime is, of course, 
that the socio-political system has changed a lot since 1967-70, 
although in rather subtle ways, not always very obvious ones. Yet the 
above-mentioned characterisations all tend to imply something 
essential, timeless or unchanging about the regime, which is of course 
quite misleading about any political system, at any place or time. On 
the other hand, we do need such analytical concepts for various 
purposes, and we delude ourselves if we dismiss the arguments about 
which are the most appropriate, as mere hair-splitting. This is not a 
suitable occasion to become embroiled in arguments over such matters, 
however, and I want to do no more than mention their potential 
relevance to our main concern here, i.e. to the extent which the political 
tides appear to be shifting in the late 1980s, hence altering the 
directions in which they may carry the ship of state - and/or the society 
also - over the next few years. 
I have argued elsewhere that the New Order regime changed during 
the course of the 1970s from something like a bureaucratic polity to 
something far better characterised as a patrimonialist political system 
(Mackie 1984). It could equally be argued that it has been less of a 
military-dominated regime since about 1983-84 than it was ten years 
earlier, being now a more personalistic form of authoritarian rule, 
dominated by the quite singular capacity of President Suharto to impose 
his own distinctive stamp on the political system. The characteristics of 
his mode of government combine a curious mixture of a traditional 
sultanistic court and of a technocrat's rational administration, as well as 
of an avuncular paternalistic bapak and a ruthlessly authoritarian 
military leader accustomed to being obeyed, of a very modern man and 
yet a still highly traditional one, of the outwardly Muslim and the 
inwardly syncretist Javanese. 
He remains an enigma even to those who know him well, in a way 
that his predecessor, Sukarno, never was, .,for even Sukarno's most 
private affairs were carried on in a blaze of publicity that Suharto shuns. 
'What does that man think?', mused a prominent Jakarta political leader 
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several years ago; 'No one knows what he thinks. That is the secret of 
his power. Everyone is trying to read his mind, but no one can guess 
which way he will decide to jump next.' Suharto has taken institutions 
and the outer forms of legality very seriously ever since he came to 
office in 1966-67; but has he really institutionalised the basic structure 
of the New Order regime over the years, or has he simply personalised 
it (Liddle 1985)? He has not allowed Golkar to grow into an autonomous 
power base within the regime (and it is unlikely to be allowed to do so 
in the next few years). The Armed Forces are certainly a crucial pillar of 
the regime and in some way or another will play a decisive role in 
deciding the succession; yet it is not at all clear how this will be done 
and at present the President seems in some respects to be holding the 
Armed Forces leaders at arms length rather than drawing them more 
fully into the processes of governmental decision-making, conceding as 
little as possible to them, not as much. For the peculiar balance-of-
power politics he seems to be playing out in his dealings with 
Sudharmono and General Moerdani is hard to categorise in any way, 
except to say 
balancing act 
years before 
more personal 
that it is all very Javanese, not altogether unlike Sukarno's 
between the Army leadership and the PKI in his final 
1965, although far less institutional in this case and far 
(Legge 1972; ch. 14 ). And it is hard to imagine this 
changing very much in the immediate future, for we are now entering 
whether 
looming 
the end-game phase of the Suharto regime's political life, 
anyone wishes to acknowledge the fact openly or not. The 
imminence of the succession issue makes that unavoidable, no matter 
how many years of life or office the President may still have remaining 
to him. As in all autocracies, the approaching end and the problem of 
leadership change makes a big difference to the stakes of the political 
game. 
Yet politics is not solely about the power struggle, of course, but 
also about policies and sometimes principles also. Policy issues such as 
deregulation and privatisation of the vast, overbloated public 
corporations in Indonesia have been issues of lively debate in many 
quarters over the last few years - and some progress has 
towards those goals, although in an entirely ad hoc manner, 
consistently, nor very far, nor with any strong or 
commitment to such goals. My impression is that there has 
been made 
not at all 
doctrinaire 
been rather 
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less talk and action on those fronts 
over the previous couple of years; 
Certainly there is very little sign 
ideological issues and the underlying 
over the last twelve months than 
but I may have missed something. 
of any linkage between these 
power struggle going on around 
the President, except to the extent that certain particular institutions are 
identified with specific policy preferences, like Habibie's and Ginanjar's 
push for economic nationalism rather than market-oriented policies. 
The more technocratic ministers have remained fairly consistently 
committed to the step-by-step deregulation of an over-controlled 
economy and towards greater reliance on market forces and 
competition, even though the progress they have been able to make in 
this direction has been painfully slow, with the Pakdes trade 
deregulation measures of December · 1987, then the next major reform 
packages of the banking and trading system not being announced until 
October-November 1988. The pace of change at the ideological level has 
also been glacially slow, at least in terms of policy outcomes, although as 
I will argue in a later section of this paper some significant long-term 
shifts appear to be occurring. 
The 1988 MPR session 
While the main preoccupation at the MPR session (Peoples 
Consultative Assembly, a sort of 'super-parliament' which includes all 
members of parliament/DPR, plus a large number of government 
nominees) when it met in February-March, was with the President's 
choice of his Vice President for the next five years, hence with the 
handling of the S udharmono-Moerdani rivalry, there were several other 
minor aspects of it that were 
suggestions that the procedures 
interesting. There 
would be more 'open' 
had earlier been 
and democratic 
this year. For example, there was an announcement from the Palace 
that MPR factions would be allowed to nominate their own candidates 
for Vice President, provided that specified criteria be met, one of them 
that the candidates must be acceptable to 'those who express their 
support through the dominant group' (i.e. Golkar and/or ABRI). The 
Muslim party, PPP, seized this opportunity to nominate Jaelani Naro 
(with alleged encouragement from Moerdani supporters who were 
seeking to create maximum difficulties for Sudharmono, since Moerdani 
was by then out of the running for the Vice-Presidency - if, indeed, he 
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ever was seriously considered as a candidate); but Naro was not 
expected to push his candidacy as hard as he did before withdrawing at 
the last moment, so as to enable the candidacy of Sudharmono to go 
through by acclamation, once the President had revealed his preference 
for him. 
There was also a lot of debate prior to and into the full MPR 
sessions about the content of the GBHN (the 'Broad Outlines of State 
Policy', determined every five years by the MPR). The committee 
discussions on this which are normally expected to produce a consensus 
document to be discussed, then endorsed, in the MPR, continued longer 
and later than usual because the non-Muslim PDI faction was 
demanding a greater degree of democratisation of the procedures of 
both DPR (parliament) and MPR. It finally dropped its pressures for the 
sake of allowing the appearance of consensus to be maintained; but PPP 
went further and insisted on forcing a floor vote in the MPR over its 
amendments to the GBHN draft, a most unusual procedure. I doubt if it 
has much long-term significance, however. This kind of 'democratic 
space' may be opened up briefly on such occasions when there is a 
power struggle going on within the ruling circles, as there was this year, 
but I doubt that it represents the beginning of a long-term trend arising 
out of pressures from below from stronger societal forces, or that we 
will see it continuing into the future. 
There had been a lot of speculation in the months prior to the MPR 
about who would be chosen by Suharto as Vice President, since the new 
saliency of succession politics gave added significance to this post. The 
very obvious rivalry between Sudharmono and Moerdani for the 
position gave lots of grist to the Jakarta rumour mills, producing utterly 
confident but contradictory predictions in the weeks preceding the MPR 
session and creating the only note of real expectancy in the who 1 e 
proceedings. But a clear signal seemed to be conveyed in the President's 
rebuff to Moerdani shortly before the MPR meeting, calling for his 
resignation as Armed Forces Commander (Kasab) - but not of Kopkamtib, 
interestingly and replacing him with Gen. Try Sutrisno, so that 
Moerdani no longer had formal command over troops by the time of the 
meeting. From this time on all the signs seemed to point to the 
likelihood that Sudharmono would be nominated, as he ultimately was -
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and elected unanimously, according to the standard convention. But the 
blatant hostility to him of members of the ABRI faction was only thinly 
disguised. Rumours about his alleged links with PKI elements at the 
time of the Madiun revolt (and later) were clearly intended to 
undermine his position. Moerdani's covert support for POI and even 
PPP against Golkar, of which Sudharmono was the chairman, was well 
known. And the culmination came when Col. Ibrahim Saleh, an obscure 
member of the ABRI faction, leapt to the microphone to protest the 
nomination of Sudharmono, a quite extraordinary breach of the 
etiquette associated with the consensus mode of proceeding. The 
sniping against 
then and the 
Sudharmono from the ABRI side has continued since 
Moerdani-Sudharmono 
polarising issue in Indonesian politics, 
rivalry remains 
with the Army 
the central 
seeking, with 
considerable success, to weaken his control over Golkar in the run-up to 
the October national assembly of Golkar. 
The new cabinet 
After that little storm in a tea-cup, the Cabinet changes which 
followed soon after brought few surprises. There were 19 new faces 
and 19 old, with the military representation declining slightly from 15 
to 11. Moerdani steps up to become Minister for Defence. Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja and Ali Wardhana were dropped from their senior 
positions as Foreign Minister and Menko Ekuin respectively; but their 
successors were entirely uncontroversial, the very competent 
a career diplomat previously representing Indonesia at the 
Radius Prawiro, a long-time associate of the technocrats 
Ali Alatas, 
UN, and 
(although 
slightly outside the mainstream group, having come up through Bank 
Indonesia). The appointment of Rudini as Minister for Internal Affairs 
was an interesting choice and he could be a man to watch over the next 
few years : he had been Army Chief of Staff before Try Sutrisno, but is 
said to be by no means just a Moerdani man, having had some tussles 
with him at that time. He had dropped out of the limelight for a couple 
of years, but presumably still has good contacts with Army officers and 
could emerge as a significant political force in his own right in that key 
ministry. One Jakarta correspondent described it to me as a brilliant 
choice on Suharto's part, pluralising the power constellations around him 
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just a little more. (Some rumours have it that Moerdani was hoping for 
that Ministry, which has control over a substantive mechanism of formal 
control, the entire regional government apparatus, the pamong praja, 
rather than the now rather emasculated Ministry of Defence, he himself 
having earlier reshuffled the key decision-making functions of the latter 
into the hands of the Armed Forces Commander in Chief.) Another man 
to watch is Moerdiono, who has moved from Cabinet Secretary to State 
Secretary (Sekretaris Negara), which was Sudharmono's former job, 
virtually the gate-keeper to the Presidential Office. He is said to be not 
part of the Sudharmono circle but very much his own man, but with 
good connections with the civilian politicians. So if the President is 
trying to maintain some sort of balance between the Sudharmono faction 
and the Moerdani-ABRI faction, as he virtually must in present 
circumstances, men like Moerdiono and Rudini might well find 
themselves strategically placed beneficiaries. 
Other appointments worth noting include the shift of Ginanjar, one 
of the most vigorous and successful of the 'economic nationalists' (and 
said to be a 'Sudharmono man') to the Oil-Energy portfolio, replacing 
Subroto, who has since become OPEC Secretary General. Ginanjar is said 
to be close to Habibie as well as Sudharmono, so he could become a 
powerful figure, although he failed to get his man appointed as the new 
head of Pertamina shortly after he became Minister. Among the 
technocrats a strong team, including some 'more professionally oriented' 
junior ministers has emerged, but no major departure from past policies 
is expected, with the balance of power having 'shifted in favour of 
export orientation and away from the deregulation cum high technology 
lobby' at least temporarily (Jayasuriya and Manning 1987:4-5). In 
addition to Radius Prawiro as Menko Ekuin, the appointments of 
Sumarlin to Finance, Siregar (and Soedrajat) to Trade, Cosmos Batubara 
to Manpower, Adrianus Mooy to Bank Indonesia and Saleh Afiff to 
Bappenas all bring very competent men into key positions, as do the 
various Agriculture and Forestry appointments. Emil Salim retains his 
Population and Environment portfolio, Fuad Hasan Education and 
Habibie his Research and Technology empire. Harmoko remains as 
Information Minister, although there had been rumours that August 
Marpaung, former Ambassador to Australia, was under consideration for 
that post. 
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The so-called 'Sudharmono group' in the cabinet still includes the 
Justice-Attorney General's group (Ismail Saleh and Sukharton), but not, 
it is said, the new group of younger men prominent in Golkar over 
recent years : Sarwono Kusamaatmadja (brother of Mochtar), Akbar 
Tanjung and Ir. Siswono Yudohusodo, all of whom could have promising 
futures. Old-timers remaining in the cabinet include the very able 
former Minister of the Interior, Soepardjo (now Co-ordinating Minister 
for Welfare), and Admiral Sudomo (Co-ordinating Minister for Politics 
and Security) . 
The Golkar leadership 
After the MPR and Cabinet changes, attention began to focus in mid-
year upon the preparations for Golkar's Third National Assembly 
(Musyawarah Nasional : Munas) in October, at which one of the key 
issues was clearly going to be the leadership question - i.e. whether 
Sudharmono would be allowed to continue as Chairman of Golkar after 
having become Vice President. The decision on this , like nearly 
everything else, rests ultimately with President Suharto, who has given 
nothing but ambiguous clues , as to his thinking on the matter, one of his 
most characteristic administrative techniques. (Sudharmono assured the 
press after a meeting with the President in August that there was no 
objection to his continuing in the role; but contrary versions of the 
President's thinking were circulating soon afterwards.) There was a lot 
of talk about the decentralisation and democratisation of the processes 
by which delegates to the October Munas would be chosen, which was to 
be left to the regional chapters of Golkar (provincial and kabupaten) to 
determine. But in practice it seems that this has just meant increased 
military intervention and control of Golkar affairs at the local level, 
resulting in very heavy military representation at Munas, with ex-
Governor Wahono of East Java, a former ABRI man, emerging almost 
unheralded in October as the front-running candidate for the job, which 
he subsequently got, presumably at the behest of the President. 
This may mean the end of the 1983-88 phase of civilianisation of 
Golkar under the leadership of Sudharmono and Sarwono 
Kusumaatmadja (Sec. Gen.), who inaugurated the move to create 
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individual as well as groups membership of Golkar, partly in order to 
change its image as simply a tool of the bureaucracy and the Army. 
With both those men no longer at the helm and the Armed Forces 
playing a more active role in Golkar both nationally and regionally, any 
hopes that the organisation might become an alternative wad ah 
(vehicle) for political participation by individual civilians other than PDI 
and PPP, the old-established parties, no longer look very promising! 
Armed Forces leadership changes 
With the retirement of General Benny Moerdani from active 
service in February, his replacement as Kasab by the former Army Chief 
of Staff, General Try Sutrisno, and Moerdani's later appointment as 
Minister for Defence and Security, a major reshuffle of the top echelons 
of the Armed Forces leadership has taken place. Try Sutrisno was 
replaced as Army Chief of Staff by Lt. Gen. Edy Sudrajat, formerly his 
Deputy, and he by Maj. Gen. A.S. Rajagukguk, the Kostrad (Strategic 
Reserve) Commander, whose replacement there was Maj. Gen. Sugito 
from Kodam Jaya. Various senior regional (Kodam) commanders had 
been appointed in the course of 1987 in accordance with the series of 
far-reaching changes in the structure of regional commands put through 
by Moerdani during his long term, almost five years, as Armed Forces 
Commander. 
There are no longer any 1945 Generation officers still serving in the 
Armed Forces and the men now at the top are almost all, apart from Try 
Sutrisno (trained in the Engineering Academy), from classes 1 and 2 of 
the AMN (National Military Academy, at Magelang) - class 1 mostly in 
staff positions and class 2 in regional commands, according to Anderson 
( 1988: 138). The training and career paths of these men have been very 
different from those of the 1945 Generation, most of them having had 
little. or no combat experience (except in East Timor in a few cases). So 
they are likely to prove distinctly different in both outlook and 
qualifications from their predecessors, being in most cases, technically 
better trained and better educated, but without the breadth of political 
experience that the 1945 Generation officers unavoidably acquired. 
They are also substantially older, on average, than were the leading 
1945 Generation officers by the time they reached the top, mostly in 
=-
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their late forties or early fifties, many with less than ten years of active 
service ahead of them (Anderson 1988). It is worth noting also that the 
old divisional solidarities based on regions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, 
Brawijaya etc.) which constituted a basis for Army factionalism in the 
1950-60s have now almost entirely been superseded by AMN year 
groupings, such as we have seen in Thailand and the Philippines (and, 
indeed, many other countries) for some years now. It remains to be 
seen whether these new Magelang-trained officers will prove to be more 
professionally-oriented, less 'political' or any more 'clean' than their 
predecessors, as some observers have predicted (perhaps whistling in 
the wind a little); but almost certainly their attitudes to their jobs and to 
national politics will be rather different from those of the 1945 
Generation perhaps less tolerant of civilian politicians and overt 
expressions of dissent or disagreement because they have had so little 
experience of being answered back. 
The rise of General Try Sutrisno to top leadership of the Armed 
Forces is often taken to imply that he is now the 'Crown Prince' or likely 
successor to President Suharto, since there are no obvious rivals to him 
if the issue arises in the near future. He rose to prominence after being 
an aide to the President for some years, then becoming a regional 
commander, then Army Chief of Staff. It is often suggested that he is 
Suharto's favoured candidate for future leadership, although the 
evidence for that is problematic. He has also established good relations 
with the Islamic community and has built up a favourable reputation in 
Jakarta civilian circles more generally, although he has yet to prove 
himself as a tough and decisive leader as well as a consensus builder. 
A new law on 'soldiering' (UU Keprajuritan) is another development 
of 1987-8 of some importance. The most substantial change it has 
introduced was to raise the age of compulsory retirement from active 
duty of senior officers from 55 to 60, as also in Thailand, USA and many 
other countries. This will have the effect of ensuring that the new wave 
of AMN graduates, some of whom will soon be approaching 55 and have 
had to wait until much later in life to reach the most senior command 
positions, will have at least ten years at the top before they leave to 
retire. (This will make them a less imminent threat to the 1945 
Generation ex-officers now occupying well-paid civilian jobs.) But it will 
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also delay the promotions of younger AMN officers and may cause them 
some heart-burning (Anderson 1988:42). One intriguing aspect of this 
new law is that a great deal of discussion took place in military circles, 
then in the parliament (DPR) from October 1987 until February 1988, 
before full agreement could be reached on it. One of the matters of 
contention raised by the new law was a reinterpretation of the doctrine 
of dwifungsi, about which an element of obscurity and ambiguity still 
prevails. Some of Moerdani's statements on the subject seem to suggest 
that he is trying to modify the old belief that all former officers are 
entitled to high-level civilian jobs on their retirement and perhaps that 
he is trying to shift ABRI thinking about dwifungsi towards a more 
professional approach to 'soldiering', involving a less close involvement 
in politics. But there appears to be a good deal of scope for various 
interpretations here. 
Shifting tides in state-society relations 
Nearly all of this account has so far been dealing with the national 
and state level, the stratospheric political world where access to the 
President, the supreme source of decision-making power and 'the 
authoritative allocation of values' (to misquote Easton) is centred. But 
what else is happening out there among the vast masses of the society, 
all 170 million of them? 
Because the strengthening of state power has been such a dramatic 
feature of the changes in the socio-political landscape in Indonesia over 
the last twenty years or so, it is easy to overlook the extent to which 
societal changes are also occurring - less dramatically perhaps, more 
imperceptibly, but possibly more inexorably. During a recent discussion 
I had with Andrew Macintyre about the relative power of state and 
societal forces before and since 1965 (the latter strong and the former 
weak before 1965, but since then almost entirely the opposite), he 
suggested to me that important changes have been occurring over the 
last few years which attest to the growing strength and resilience of 
society-based forces and institutions. Many pressures from below are 
now emerging, he says, which the state can no longer control or 
accommodate through essentially corporatist techniques, as in the oil-
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boom years; instead, it now has to take cognizance of them and adjust to 
them. By that he means, essentially, that the emergence of an 
increasingly autonomous business class (or some such entity: 
terminological disputes about 'the middle class' or 'the bourgeoisie' seem 
to me not very helpful in all this) is resulting in pressures from below 
for policy reforms and more effective lobbying of government agencies 
on behalf of business interests. The latter, according to Macintyre 
(1988), are now becoming increasingly sophisticated in their lobbying 
and PR techniques, increasingly self-confident and indeed daring in their 
willingness to fight bureaucratic battles that they would have avoided a 
few years ago - in short, they are stronger and better able to act more 
independently of government then duriQg the strongly patrimonialist 
phase of the New Order's development in the 1970s, at the height of the 
oil-boom. 
It would be a mistake to overemphasise the extent of this change, 
but on the basis of Macintyre's highly illuminating investigations into 
several cases of business-government relations in contemporary 
Indonesia, I believe he is right to stress that some very significant 
changes in the relative strengths of these two sides are occurring. He 
notes that three types of change are taking place simultaneously; 
economical, institutional and ideological. The most obvious are the 
economic changes, on which he summarises Anne Booth's comments in 
1986 that -
government has . . . been the main driving force behind the 
economy [for most of the post-independence period] . . . the 
private sector has been relegated to secondary importance 
The decline in real resources available to the government . 
has coincided with growing sentiment in favour of deregulation 
and liberalisation in many aspects of Indonesia's economy. For 
the first time in her post-independence history, it now seems 
as if the private sector could become the engine of growth for 
the national economy (Booth 1986:24, in Macintyre 1988:278). 
In the present circumstances of fiscal constraint, the government more 
urgently needs a flourishing and efficient private sector, so it is more 
willing to listen to businessmen's complaints. And business has not 
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been passive in all this, says Macintyre, but has been shouting louder, 
invoking the aid of the press and NGOs and even parliamentary 
committees to embarass negligent bureaucrats and prod them into 
action. It is still quite exceptional, however, for business firms to 
engage in overt lobbying activities of the kind we are familiar with in 
Australia or USA, although some first steps in that direction were taken 
by the three industry associations studied by Macintyre, with quite 
unprecedented success in one case. 
Two or three swallows don't make a summer, of course, and 
Macintyre is careful to avoid exaggerating the significance of the 
changes he has observed. He notes that in a new law reordering the 
position of Kadin (the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a peak 
association made up of various other local and natural trade 
associations), it was a major ideological breakthrough that the profit 
motive was explicitly acknowledged as a defining feature of a business 
enterprise, for the first time ever in an official statute (Macintyre 198 8: 
69, 278). And if that represents a major breakthrough, there is a long 
way to go before anything like a more full-blooded private-enterprise 
form of capitalism takes root there. Macintyre comments that at the 
level of ideological change 'firm evidence of shifts in ideological outlook, 
or perhaps of political culture, is scant', although there are various 
indications of changing public attitudes to business, less disdainful than 
in the past. 
The tides may be starting to turn, but they are not yet running at 
all strongly in any one new direction that we can easily identify. It is 
hard to discern with any great confidence which way they are flowing, 
because there are still so many cross-currents and indeterminate factors 
to be taken into account. The bureaucratic habits, institutions and mind-
sets established over many years of governmental dominance over the 
political and administrative system are going to take a long time to 
change. Business organisations are still lacking in political clout and 
ideological self-confidence, although a few of the more daring private 
businessmen have begun to apply what we would call lobbying tactics 
with some slight success. This does not mean that Indonesia is becoming 
a democratic or highly pluralistic politico-economic system, let alone a 
fully-fledged capitalist one (as Thailand now is), or even that the new 
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trends will necessarily continue very far in that direction (if, for 
example, an authoritarian backlash occurs as a result of a succession 
crisis, or a swing towards state corporatism). The general ideological 
climate is still strongly antipathetic to both capitalism and 'free-fight 
liberalism', although there has been much wider acceptance of the 
concepts of de reg ill as i (deregulation) and privatisation over the last 
couple of years, as the generally poor financial record of the state 
corporation has become a matter of public scandal and budgetary 
difficulties, at a time of fiscal austerity. 
The main political actors are mostly concerned just now with the 
jockeying for power and access to the . President's ear in the run-up to 
the succession stakes than they are with laying out an ideological blue-
print to indicate what an intrinsically Indonesian form of 'Panca Sila 
society' is to be like, if it is to be neither socialistic nor capitalistic. The 
use of the PKI scare as a device to discredit Sudharmono has probably 
had the effect of shifting the ideological centre of gravity a little farther 
to the right (since no-one in the elite is likely to stand up as a 
countervailing force on the left): but that does not mean we may expect 
a more tolerant attitude towards capitalism or private business. It may 
well mean a more dirigiste and assertive role for the state, with some 
contraction of the scope for private initiative in the name of regulation 
and the need for control. There is little evidence to suggest that the 
Magelang generation of ABRI officers now coming to the top will be any 
more liberal-minded, tolerant or well-disposed towards private business 
than the 1945 Generation officers have been; in fact, they may be much 
less so, more disciplinarian and tough-minded in all spheres of national 
life, since they have not been accustomed to the cut and thrust of debate 
and disagreements. 
But we will have to wait at least another couple of years before any 
clear indications are available of the way their views on the future 
shape of Indonesian society are developing. Meanwhile, I would guess 
that we can expect a slightly more hard-line approach to civilian and 
human rights issues from the present bunch of power-holders (but not 
much), some further progress on economic deregulation and possibly 
some privatisation of the less profitable public enterprises (but not 
much), some slight increase in the capacity of societal groups such as 
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trade associations to lobby government agencies on public policy issues 
(but very little, really) and some slight extension of pluralist features in 
the party system. Only if there is a major political crisis due to 
increasing financial hardships or a rice crisis, or some such, are ariy such 
changes likely to extend very far before 1992-93, however. All sorts of 
things might then change but meanwhile there seems to be no 
willingness by anyone of any significance 
involved in rocking the boat at all seriously. 
most members of the elite seem to feel they 
in Jakarta to take the risks 
Despite all their grumbling, 
still have enough at stake in 
the survival of the Suharto regime to be disinclined to destabilise it in 
any way. 
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Chapter 4 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN INDONESIA: 
AN OVERVIEW• 
Hal Hill 
Why regional development? 
Indonesia is an extraordinarily diverse nation in its geography, 
economy, ecology, demography and culture. For this fact alone, a study 
of regional development performance and issues is warranted. But 
there were two additional reasons for selecting the daerah (region) as 
the focus for the afternoon session of the School's 1988 Indonesia 
Update - apart from the large body of research already undertaken in 
the Regional Surveys and the East Java projects, two major research 
programs being coordinated in the School. 
First, declining oil prices and the central government's fiscal 
austerity have produced a major re-evaluation of centre-region 
economic relations in Indonesia. Fuelled by the dramatic increases in oil 
revenue and foreign aid in the 1970s, and motivated by a desire to avoid 
problems of regional insurrection which plagued Soekarno's Orde Lama 
(Old Order), Jakarta pumped money out to the provincial and lower level 
governments on an unprecedented scale. Grants to the regions, and its 
own direct expenditures, rose in real terms at an unprecedented pace, so 
much so that substantial problems of absorptive capacity emerged in 
many provinces, especially those with weak administrative structures. 
However, since 1983 - and especially since early 1986 Jakarta's 
precarious finances have resulted in large real declines in government 
expenditure, especially after allowing for its mounting debt-service 
• This draws on the results of a large project coordinated by the author, to be 
published as Hal Hill (ed), Unity and Diversity Regional Economic 
Development in Indonesia since 1970, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1989. 
In particular, chapter I of that volume summarises the key issues and findings 
of the research project. 
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obligations.I A large component of the central government's routine 
(recurrent expenditures) budget comprises salaries for civil servants. 
While these have' already fallen in real terms in recent years, the scope 
for Jakarta maintaining its regional expenditures in the face of sharply 
declining oil revenue is limited.2 Economic necessity, 
that Jakarta's administrative control some would 
and a recognition 
say stranglehold -
over the d a era h has been excessive, have focussed attention on 
decentralisation and measures to encourage regional initiative. Some 
minor reforms loosening central government control were introduced 
earlier in the year; these are likely to be extended in Repelita V (the 
Fifth Five Year Development Plan), which commences in April 1989. In 
the process of promoting greater regional autonomy, a better 
understanding of the regional economies is obviously desirable. 
Secondly, our knowledge of the regional economies is now much 
better than it was a few years ago, owing mainly to the vast 
improvement in the quality and quantity of regional economic and social 
statistics. For example, it was just 20 years ago that the first set of 
regional income statistics was produced. These were, understandably, 
rudimentary in nature, and it was not until the mid-1970s that any real 
confidence could be attached to such estimates. Over the same period, 
the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) has been producing a remarkably 
wide range of statistics, covering demography, labour force, agriculture, 
industry, foreign trade, and social developments.3 It is now possible to 
1 
2 
3 
See several 'Survey of Recent Developments', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, in particular that by David Evans in the December 1988 issue, for 
further discussion of this issue. 
This argument of course assumes that non-oil tax revenue cannot be increased 
quickly and substantially, and that the government is not prepared to adopt a 
policy of deficit financing in support of infrastructure projects. While the 
first proposition is undoubtedly correct, the second is at least partly open to 
question, especially among those who advocate more attention to rural public 
works projects. For an example of the latter, see Peter Mccawley, 'Investasi dan 
Kesempatan Kerja di Daerah Pedesaan' ['Investment and Employment 
Opportunities in Rural Areas'), P risma, 17(1), 1988, pp.27-33. 
Researchers on Indonesia are now blessed with such a rich variety of statistics 
that it may seem churlish to point to any remaining shortcomings. But two 
need to be highlighted. First, comprehensive data on regional resource flows 
are not available (although a start has been made), so there are no published 
sets of regional expenditure accounts. Secondly, discrepancies still remain in 
figures published at the national and local level, and between various 
branches of government (for example, the Department of Agriculture and BPS 
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investigate patterns of regional development in a far more thorough 
fashion than was possible during the Orde Lama, or even the first 
decade of the Orde Baru. Although it is one of the most heterogeneous 
nations on earth, Indonesia fortunately possesses one of the most 
comprehensive sets of regional socio-economic statistics. 
A glance at the record 
The measurement of 'development' is so complex and the array of 
available socio-economic indicators so extensive that it is obviously 
impossible to examine here the dimensions of regional development in 
Indonesia in any detail. To provide an overview of levels and trends, 
two key indicators - one economic, the other social - are presented in 
Table 4.1. 
The most suitable economic indicator is non-mining GDP per capita 
on a 'price adjusted' basis (i.e. allowing for regional price differentials). 
Mining is excluded because it consists overwhelmingly of oil and gas, the 
returns from which accrue principally to productive factors outside the 
province of production - either to Pertamina, the Central Government (in 
effect the same thing), or foreign mining companies. The inclusion of 
mining clearly renders GDP per capita a rather meaningless indicator of 
economic development in the resource-rich provinces. 
Two features stand out in the estimates of GDP per capita. First, 
while there are considerable variations, most provinces are bunched 
within a range of about 20 per cent either side of the mean. Even 
excluding mining, the resource-rich provinces and Jakarta are obviously 
the most prosperous. In 1975, Jakarta, East Kalimantan and Riau clearly 
stood out, as they did in 1984; in both years the figure for the former 
two was well over double the national average. It is not difficult to 
explain Jakarta's prominence: as the seat of national government, all 
manner of funds flow to and through it, while it also possesses the most 
developed service economy in the country, and a strong manufacturing 
base. The high figures for the resource-rich provinces - notwithstanding 
on food and cash crop production). These discrepancies are, however, 
becoming less frequent and less serious. 
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TABLE 4. 1: Regional Development Indicators in Indonesia 
Province GDP per capita 
(price adjusted, excluding mining, Rp) 
Ac eh 
North Sumatra 
West Sumatra 
Riau 
Jam bi 
South Sumatra 
Bengkulu 
Lampung 
Jakarta 
West Java 
Central Java 
Yogyakarta 
East Java 
West Kalimantan 
Central Kalimantan 
South Kalimantan 
East Kalimantan 
North Sulawesi 
Central Sulawesi 
South Sulawesi 
Southeast Sulawesi 
Bali 
West Nusatenggara 
East Nusatenggara 
Maluku 
Irian Jaya 
INDONESIA 
Sources and Notes · 
1975 1984 . Annual Real 
Growth(%) 
1975-84 
current prjces 
72,505 
91,592 
59,898 
113,956 
64,531 
88,317 
49,778 
67,964 
195,903 
68,891 
66,844 
69,953 
78,213 
72,105 
67,531 
49,347 
214,980 
64,358 
55,244 
73,696 
50,916 
71,026 
50,945 
32,174 
69,843 
n.a. 
77,013.4 
469,246 
426,795 
431,490 
543,366 
297,488 
533,530 
315,467 
212,910 
1,191,946 
323,782 
307,697 
305,468 
397,680 
338,199 
511,388 
425,845 
1,316,149 
343,572 
278,788 
305,445 
298,989 
414,698 
210,448 
197,336 
388,679 
311,793 
440,135 
8.5 
5.9 
8.9 
1.9 
2.7 
6.4 
9.3 
0.5 
7.8 
6.6 
6.5 
4.0 
6.8 
5.3 
7.5 
5.0 
3.8 
5.3 
4.5 
5.1 
5.4 
IO. I 
5.3 
5.8 
4.4 
n.a. 
5.7 
Infant Mortality 
(per 1,000) 
1977 /78 1985 Decrease 
1977/78 -
1985(%) 
91 
91 
121 
113 
118 
118 
106 
97 
80 
129 
96 
62 
99 
116 
100 
121 
99 
94 
128 
108 
114 
88 
187 
124 
124 
106 
107 
45 
58 
77 
59 
62 
71 
62 
59 
32 
84 
70 
37 
71 
54 
73 
88 
42 
55 
78 
65 
78 
64 
146 
88 
80 
n.a . 
72 
50.6 
36.3 
36.4 
47.8 
47.5 
. 39.8 
41.5 
39.2 
60.0 
34.9 
27.1 
40.3 
28.3 
53.5 
27.0 
27.3 
57.6 
41.5 
39.1 
39.8 
31.6 
27.3 
21.9 
29.0 
35.5 
n.a . 
32.7 
--Regional GDP estimates are from BPS, Pendapatan Regional Provinsi-Provinsi di 
Indonesia [Provincial Income in Indonesia], various issues. 
--Regional price data for adjusting the GDP series are from H.W. Arndt and R. M. 
Sundrum, 'Regional Price Disparities', Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies , 
11(2), 1975; and BPS,Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum [Minimum Physical Needs], various 
issues . 
--Population data are interpolated from BPS, Sensus Penduduk [Population Census] 
1971 and 1980, and Supas 1985. Infant mortality estimates are from G.J. Hugo et al., 
The Demographic Dimension in Indonesian Development, Oxford University Press, 
Singapore, 1987; and K. Streatfield and A. Larson, 'The 1985 Intercensal Survey of 
Indonesia : 4. Infant and Child Mortality Levels', Research Note number 14CS, 
International Population Dynamics Program, Department of Demography, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1987. 
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the exclusion of mmmg - suggest that there may be some local spill-over 
effects (especially in downstream processing), although the timber boom 
also explains the special result in East Kalimantan. Other high figures -
Aceh, South Sumatra, Central Kalimantan - similarly reflect a strong 
natural resource specialisation. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
figures indicate the extreme poverty of the Nusa Tenggara provinces, 
which had very low per capita GDP in both years . Together with 
Lampung, most of Java and a good deal of Sulawesi, they constitute the 
most serious challenges to economic development in contemporary 
Indonesia . 
The second feature of the regional accounts is that there is 
substantially more variation in rates of economic growth than in per 
capita GDP. An encouraging feature of the growth rates is that many of 
the provinces with below average per capita GDP in 1975 have grown 
more quickly than the country as a whole. Particularly notable is the 
tourist island of Bali which, while lacking any mineral wealth, grew at 
almost twice the national average. Other very good performers include 
Ac eh, West Sumatra and Bengkulu in Sumatra (although the latter's 
figure needs to be viewed with more than usual caution owing to the 
'small initial base' problem); the three large provinces of Java all appear 
to have done well, with East Java marginally superior. Even the poorest 
province, East Nusa Tenggara (putting aside the special case of East 
Timor, for which reliable data were not available), grew at a rate 
approximating the national average. 
Equally, the regional growth rates highlight serious problems. 
Lampung is the most obvious. Eighty years of transmigration have 
contributed to a situation in which the province has among the very 
lowest of per capita GDP, and by far the poorest growth rate. Lampung's 
deterioration is now so pronounced that its per capita GDP is well below 
that throughout Java. Most of the other poor provinces which have 
failed to keep up with the rest of the country are in eastern Indonesia, 
including Maluku and several in Sulawesi. There is clearly a strong case 
for concerted development efforts in this part of Indonesia. 
It is useful to balance this economic perspective with an indicator 
of soCial development. Infant mortality is obviously a key variable, 
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although many others could have been selected. The infant mortality 
estimates display a similar picture of regional variations, although one in 
which the decline over the period 1977/78-1985 was rather more 
uniform. In contrast to the GDP figures, the record of Java, with its 
superior health services, is a good deal better than elsewhere. In both 
years, Jakarta and Yogyakarta recorded the lowest rates, although the 
mix of economic, social and cultural explanatory variables differs . West 
Java consistently stands out as having the poorest record on infant 
mortality, as it does on most other social indicators. 
Outside Java the record is mixed. The most alarming case is clearly 
West Nusa Tenggara, which has not only the highest infant mortality 
rate but also the slowest rate of decline from 1977 /78 to 1985. In other 
isolated provinces, such as Central and Southeast Sulawesi and Maluku, 
the rates are above average, although declining at close to the national 
average. The level for South Kalimantan, and its slow decline, is not easy 
to explain, especially in relation to the lower figures for the other three 
provinces on the island. According to these estimates, it is the eight 
provinces of Sumatra which have done best of the provinces outside 
Java, all but one being below the national average in 1985, and all 
having a sharper decline over the period discussed. 
Issues for the future 
How can a financially constrained central government maintain the 
momentum of regional development in an era of low oil prices? Clearly 
the strategy of rig id central controls and huge direct grants to the 
regions is no longer appropriate . A new emphasis should probably 
contain at least four major initiatives. 
First, a complete overhaul of regional finances is long overdue. 
The current system provides little scope for regional initiatives both 
because the provincial and lower level governments have control over 
very few taxes and because, even when they have such authority, the 
structure and rates of these taxes are determined in intricate detail by 
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Jakarta.1 Reform of the tax system should encourage some fiscal 
decentralisation, including the transfer of taxes with some revenue 
'buoyancy', while also ensuring that minimum social and economic 
development targets are achieved on a national basis. There is obviously 
no case, in a unitary state, for a return to the 1960s ADO (Alokasi Devisa 
0 tom at is) system, which allocated foreign exchange receipts in 
proportion to the provincial composition of exports. But it is equally 
obvious that a middle course needs to be steered between that sort of 
arrangement and the current, over-centralised system. 
Secondly, a high priority should continue to be accorded to the 
further development of regional social and physical infrastructure. 
Despite the large investments of the past 20 years, the state of regional 
infrastructure remains a major bottleneck to development, and it lags 
behind that of many neighbouring countries. While recognising the 
macroeconomic case for fiscal constraint, it is important not to lose sight 
of regional development needs. New and imaginative funding packages 
have to be developed. One such approach, already employed in the case 
of toll roads, is the user-pays principle. Anotl:ier is to encourage greater 
private sector involvement. Yet another is to tap foreign aid sources 
more aggressively, accompanied by a relaxation in regulations 
concerning implementation and provision of local (counterpart) funding. 
A third initiative concerns the more active promotion of regional 
comparative advantage. A feature of Indonesia's 'top down' strategy has 
been the fairly rigid adoption and implementation of national programs 
throughout the country, with insufficient attention being paid to local 
conditions. In a country as ecologically and demographically diverse as 
Indonesia, development policies clearly need to recognise and build on 
local strengths. Some regions (and here, given the considerable 
intraprovincial variations, it may not be appropriate to use the province 
as the basis for planning) will be better suited to the production of rice 
and other food crops. In others the comparative advantage lies in cash 
crops, 
likely 
or perhaps livestock. There are only a few regions which are 
to be major producers of export-oriented, 1 ab our-intensive 
For a recent discussion of regional finance issues, see Nick Devas, 'Local 
Government Taxation in Indonesia: Opportunities for Reform', Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 24(2), 1988. 
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manufactures. Special attention needs to be accorded to environmental 
factors in certain provinces. An explicit recognition of region-specific 
attributes will be an inducement to decentralised growth. This does not 
mean that governments should engage in detailed planning exercises 
with the aim of 'picking winners'. But it does entail sensitivity to local 
conditions, and the development of appropriate policy approaches, 
including investment priorities and training programs. 
Finally, the current trade and regulatory regimes undoubtedly 
discriminate against the regions outside Java. The 'cascading' structure 
of effective protection confers above-average protection on consumer 
goods industries, which are overwh.elmingly located on Java. In effect, 
consumers in the Outer Islands are being 'taxed' by the implicit system 
of transfers and subsidies for the benefit of producers on Java. 
Similarly, the regulatory system has powerful centralising effects, 
whether in the form of firms' decisions to locate on Java, close to the 
centres of bureaucratic power and patronage, or simply through explicit 
regulations - export bans on primary commodities, designation of certain 
'processing centres' which inhibit commercial opportunities outside 
Java. On simple grounds of efficiency it is desirable that the dispersion 
in - not to mention the average 
lowered, and that the complex, 
simplified. The 'regional equity' 
already strong argument. 
of - effective rates of protection be 
pervasive system of regulation be 
aspect substantially strengthens this 
Chapter 5 
JAKARTA: PILING DETROIT ONTO NEW YORK AND 
WASHINGTON? 
Lance Castles 
An examination of Jakarta's place in the Indonesian economy over 
recent decades raises this question for planners of regional policies in 
the 1990s: Is the national capital becoming too dominant, too crowded, 
too parasitic? 
restrained? 
Does a sound regional policy require that its growth be 
In the early years of independence, Jakarta was less of a 'primate 
city' than several other Southeast Asian capitals, but its inexorable 
growth since independence has left even Surabaya and Bandung far 
behind it. . Now characterised as the Daerah Khusus lstimewa (DKI) 
Jakarta Raya (i.e. special region administratively equal in status to a 
province), it had reached a size of nearly 3 million people by the time of 
the first census (1961); it then went on to 4.5 million in 1971 and 7.8 
million by 1985. Allowing for the overspill in to the surrounding 
districts, the entire Greater Jakarta region (acronym: Jabotabek i.e. 
Jakarta Raya, Bogor, Tanggerang, Bekasi) is projected to reach about 25 
million around the end of the century. 
Although at present it has only 5% of the nation's population, its 
economic weight is much greater: its per capita GDP was estimated in 
1983 at 2.25 times the national average, so it accounts for about one 
ninth of the nation's production of goods and services. However, both 
these GDP estimates and sample surveys of household consumption 
understate Jakarta's lead in personal income: if 'black' sources of income 
are included, its citizens probably earn three to four times as much as 
other Indonesians, thereby concentrating about 15-20% of the nation's 
purchasing power within the area of the capital. 
Various quantitative indicators tend to support this estimate. In 
relation to its population, Jakarta had 7.3 times the national average of 
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cars in or around 1985, 3.5 times as many television sets, 6. 7 times as 
many telephones, while it also paid 6.1 times as much to attend cinemas 
and sent 8.4 times as many domestic telexes (17 .3 times as many 
international). The number of doctors per 1000 inhabitants was 3. 8 
times greater than in the nation at large, pharmacies 4 times and 
hospital beds 2.7; university graduates were 4.7 times over-represented; 
and 5.1 times as many households (relatively) used gas or electricity for 
cooking. 
Directly or indirectly, it is Jakarta's role as the national capital which 
accounts for this huge lead over other provinces. Taxes and resource 
rents, especially the vast oil revenu~s. flow into the capital, and while a 
large part of them flows out again . to finance routine and development 
expenditures in the various provinces, it is notorious that a great deal 
sticks to the fingers of Jakarta's power holders. Jakarta is an attractive, 
sometimes almost mandatory, location for manufacturers, importers and 
exporters, not merely because of the capital's superior infrastructure, 
but also because of the need for access to the officials who control 
licences, quotas and contracts. 
As far as the government's formal fiscal operations are concerned, 
Jakarta has not been excessively favoured. Regional government 
expenditures represented only 3.3% of regional GDP in 1982/3, one of 
the lowest percentages in the country and, more importantly, Jakarta's 
own taxes covered its regional expenditures to a far greater extent than 
any other province. It has been the smallest recipient (per capita) of the 
government's Inpres grants. (The figure amounted to Rp. 4,067 in 
1985-6 compared with Rp. 5,794 for Central Java, Rp. 16,407 for Aceh, 
Rp.19,884 for Maluku and Rp. 32,005 for Central Kalimantan.) In fact, 
quantitative indicators suggest that the government's policy of 
p em er at a an (spreading development out, emphasised in each recent 
Five-Year Plan preface) has succeeded in keeping Jakarta's economically 
privileged position within some sort of bounds. In the earlier years of 
the New Order, its lead over the other provinces was steadily increasing, 
but over the last decade the other provinces have tended to catch up. 
For instance, Jakarta's lead in cars dropped from 9.1 times the national 
average in 1974 to 7.3 times in 1985; in doctors from 5.9 times in 1972 
to 3.8 times in 1984-5; in hotel rooms from 4 times in 1980 to 2.7 times 
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in 1985. The ratio of Jakarta's regional per capita GDP to the national 
average was no greater in 1983 than in 1971. 
It can also be argued that the large infrastructure investments in 
Jakarta have been essential if the city was to perform its national 
metropolitan role at all efficiently. Construction, utilities, transport, 
of growth. 
supply and 
communications and hotels have been notable areas 
Significantly, however, 
telephone system have 
while 
more 
Jakarta's airports, electricity 
than kept up with demand, not even an 
aggressive road construction program has been able to prevent traffic 
jams from worsening. Water supply expansion, though considerable, has 
failed to keep pace with demand, while the dependence of most of the 
population on wells, in the absence of a modern sewage system and in 
the face of seepage of seawater into the subsoil, is a grave danger to 
public health. Can 25 million people be accommodated in the year 2000 
under such conditions, even at minimal standards of livability? 
Restriction of the city's growth is indeed something one suggests 
only with reluctance, in view of the failure· of Ali Sadikin's earlier 
attempt to declare Jakarta a 'closed city'. Furthermore, it conflicts with 
the present impetus toward deregulation and debureaucratisation, 
which in other respects has so much to be said for it. (One writer has 
even suggested Indonesian bureaucrats are turning to environmentalism 
as a defence against the liberalising tendencies which threaten their 
position.) On the other hand, if Indonesia is to successfully overcome 
the crisis brought on by the decline in its oil revenues, a major 
expansion of manufacturing industry will have to occur in the next 
decade. Already there are hopeful signs of a boom in manufactured 
exports. But it would be most unfortunate if this expansion took place 
primarily in the Jakarta metropolitan region, instead of throughout the 
entire country. 
Jakarta is not at present a predominantly industrial city. Only 16 . 5% 
of its workforce is in manufacturing, contributing 17 .2% of regional GDP 
(1985 and 1984 figures). It does not dominate national manufacturing 
in terms of either employment or value of output, although it is by far 
the largest single centre. Resource-based industries like oil refining, 
fertilizers, metal-smelting and plywood are scattered elsewhere, while 
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the labour-intensive food and tobacco industries prefer Central and East 
Java. 
But Jakarta's industries have a high potential for growth. They are 
more diversified than those of other provinces, with an emphasis on the 
engineering sector, especially motor vehicles. For the individual 
investor in such industries, the attractions of locating in the Jakarta 
region are almost irresistible: superior infrastructure, access to 
government and linkages with existing industries and services. 
Nevertheless a careful policy of developing alternative bases for new 
industries (especially for the sake of a possible breakthrough to an 
efficient motor industry) could save Jakarta from the spectre of 
nightmarish pollution, overcrowding and inefficiency. 
Chapter 6 
WEST JAVA 
Joan Hardjono 
The main characteristics of the West Java economy can be 
summarised in terms of four predominant features, as set out below. 
1. The connection with Jakarta 
It is impossible to speak about West Java without referring to the 
economic growth that has occurred in the capital city, Jakarta Raya, for 
the economies of the two entities are closely interconnected. West Java 
basically bears the same sort of relationship to Jakarta that East Java 
bears to Surabaya, forming an agricultural hinterland to the national 
capital , which serves as the commercial and trading centre to both . 
West Java has gained from its proximity to Jakarta in that the spill-over 
of Jakarta's industrial and service economy has led to the emergence of 
new opportunities in manufacturing and services in the province. At the 
same time, a false impression of the extent of the development occurring 
in West Java can be created by statistics reflecting the recent 
construction of a number of large infrastructure projects which were 
established primarily to meet the industrial and other needs of Jakarta. 
The Cengkareng airport, for example, is actually located at Tanggerang in 
West Java, while the recently completed Saguling dam was designed to 
provide power and water for Jakarta, like the even larger Cirata dam 
now under construction on the Citarum. Similarly, the Jatiluhur dam, 
whose water is essential for rice production on the north coast of West 
Java, also has to generate electric power for Jakarta, which means that 
sometimes the priorities in scheduling water flows for the irrigation 
network are determined by the needs of Jakarta, not those of the 
province itself. These are only the most obvious of many ways in which 
the provincial economy of West Java is affected by the pull of the 
powerful urban economy of the national capital. 
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2. The changing economic structure of West Java 
Major structural changes have occurred in the West Java economy 
during the past 20 years. West Java now has the lowest proportion of 
its work-force engaged in agriculture of all provinces, apart from Jakarta 
Raya. The share of agriculture in the provincial GDP has fallen to almost 
half the 1960 figure, even though the production of food-crops , 
especially rice, has risen. This decline in the relative contribution of the 
agricultural sector is explained largely by the rising share of the mining 
sector, as a consequence of off-shore oil and gas exploitation to the north 
of Cirebon and Indramayu. However, its contribution creates a 
misleading impression of the impact made by that resource 
development upon economic life in West Java, for the revenue from oil 
and gas accrues to the central government, while spin-offs for the 
province in terms of employment and earnings have been small. 
The relative shares of manufacturing and trade have also declined 
somewhat in the provincial accounts because of the increase in the role 
of mining. Manufacturing remains important, however. In 1983, West 
Java's pattern of manufacturing industry was the most diverse and the 
least concentrated of all provinces except Jakarta, as far as industrial 
composition was concerned. Two industries are of special significance in 
the manufacturing pattern: textiles, and iron and steel. Although textile 
production has become relatively less predominant since 1974, West 
Java has attracted two of Indonesia's major newly-developing export-
oriented industries, garments and electronics. 
Within West Java, there is heavy concentration of industry in terms 
of regional location. Two Development Regions stand out as major 
industrial centres. The first is Botabek, which consists of the districts of 
Bogor, Tanggerang and Bekasi surrounding Jakarta Raya, and which has 
by far the largest share of industry. Botabek also has the greatest 
degree of industrial diversification, with a large number of new 
industries like chemicals, metals and machine goods. The second 
industrial centre is the Greater Bandung region, where industrial 
development is concentrated in the Municipality of Bandung and its 
periphery. The fastest rate of growth in manufacturing in the province, 
however has occurred in Banten. 
certainly very small, this growth 
occurred in the Krakatau iron 
SS 
While the initial industrial base was 
reflects the expansion that has 
and steel complex at Cilegon. 
Nevertheless, Cilegon remains an enclave area in all senses; there have 
been few spin-offs for the Banten Development Region, where most of 
the people arc still engaged in agriculture. 
3. The shift in the location of recent economic growth in the 
province 
The previous point about the distribution of industrial areas in West 
Java leads on to what is perhaps the most interesting trend in the 
provincial economy. Since the early 1970s, there has been a gradual 
shift in the economic centre of gravity away from the central upland 
region around Bandung, towards the northern part of the province, 
adjacent to Jakarta. The Bandung region, once the economic heartland of 
the province, has not in recent years displayed the same level of growth 
that it once had; instead, it is gradually dee.lining in economic 
importance. There has, in fact, been below-average growth in many 
sectors in Bandung, including the government sector itself. In particular, 
there has been a relatively low level of domestic investment in Bandung 
and an even lower level of foreign investment, even though this region 
ranks third behind Botabek and Cilegon in total investment in the 
province. With new industrial undertakings choosing to locate in 
districts closer to Jakarta, Bandung is unlikely to regain its former 
position as West Java's industrial centre, unless there is some major 
reversal of current trends. 
The shift northwards in the focus of economic activity is explained 
primarily by the spill-over from Jakarta. The three kabupaten that 
make up Botabek have all grown very rapidly, but their activities are 
geared towards the economy of Jakarta rather than to that of the 
provincial capital of Bandung. As physical conurbation accelerates, these 
districts are becoming more closely related economically to Jakarta 
rather than to West Java. Although Bandung is the provincial capital 
and has for many years been the national centre of the textile industry, 
the city and surrounding district have not been able to attract new 
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investments to the same extent as Botabek has, largely because 
investors have found that by locating in Botabek rather than Bandung 
they can be close to the Jakarta market. and to key government officials. 
The rise in Botabek's share of investment from 30 to 38 per cent was 
exactly mirrored by the decline in Bandung's share from 38 to 30 per 
cent in the 197 5-19 84 period. 
There are a couple of other reasons for the northward shift in 
economic growth besides the effect of proximity to Jakarta. There has 
been rapid development along the north coastal plain to the east of 
Jakarta because of the rice intensification program, while to the west of 
the capital economic activity has been stimulated by the enormous 
increase in transportation flows from Jakarta to Sumatra across the 
Sunda Straits, using the ferry services between Merak-Panjang and 
Merak-Bakauhuni. 
At the same time, the estate sector, which is located mainly in the 
interior of the province and was initially responsible for the 
development of Bandung and other inland cities like Sukabumi and 
Garut in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has declined 
considerably; there has been a noticeable drop in the output of all 
plantation crops, except tea. On the positive side there has been 
constant expansion in certain smallholder commercial crops, but this has 
by no means been sufficient to stimulate any real economic growth in 
the traditional plantation districts which make up much of the central 
part of the province. 
4. The long-standing disparity 
development within the province 
in levels of economic 
While striking differences in growth levels are certainly a 
characteristic of Indonesia as a whole and perhaps of all provinces to 
some extent, this phenomenon is more pronounced in West Java than in 
Central and East Java, in part because of the northward shift in 
economic activity. It is also explained in part by the physical structure 
of the province, which has very poor soils in its southern districts, as 
well as by topographical barriers that place constraints on road and rail 
communications. 
Jakarta. 
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The major reason, however, is the pull exerted by 
Cirebon and Botabek are the only Development Regions that have 
increased their share of provincial GDP. Because of the oil component, 
Cirebon, with almost one-third of West Java's GDP in 1984, had almost 
twice the per-capita GDP of the province as a whole in that year. Even 
without oil, Cirebon still ranked first . All other Development Regions 
were below the provincial average. Areas that have always been poor 
have become relatively poorer, such as Sukabumi, Tasikmalaya and 
Ciamis, which are traditional agricultural areas and have not had the 
stimulus of a new growth sector. Employment patterns, in fact, 
underline the north-south differences, for in the west, south-west and 
south-east of the province agriculture still provides most jobs. There 
has been no 'evening out' in the employment structure, as has happened 
in other provinces. Industrialisation has clearly increased West Java's 
regional disparities since the early 1980s. 
Finally, reference should be made to $Orne of West Java's main 
socio-economic problems. West Java has the highest rate of population 
growth in Java and today has the largest population of any province in 
the country, with a projected population of more than 43 million in the 
year 2000, that is, 40 per cent more than the mid-1980s figure and a 
somewhat larger population than East or Central Java. 
West Java has some of the poorest regions in Java, despite statistics 
that suggest high average incomes. Junior High School enrolments are 
the lowest - not just in Java but in all Indonesia, while the infant 
mortality rate is the second highest in the country. 
Above all, it should be noted that West Java has perhaps the most 
serious environmental problems in Java. The widespread deforestation 
that has occurred in upland regions has led to the silting up of major 
rivers like the Citarum and frequent flooding on the lowlands. The lack 
of political will to deal with the long-persisting legal and social questions 
of neglected plantation land, much of which is becoming badly eroded, 
highlights this whole environmental issue. 
Chapter 7 
EAST JAVA 
Howard Dick and Jamie Mackie 
The economy of East Java revolves around the 
of Surabaya much as that of West Java revolves 
main harbour city 
around Jakarta, 
although Surabaya exerts nowhere near the same predominance over its 
hinterland. The two provinces are also similar in the shift of population 
from the poorer southern parts .(and Madura) towards the more 
dynamic and prosperous north-central kabupaten, though again, the 
process has been less marked in East Java. The rapid population 
increase and development in what is sometimes called 'the golden 
triangle' between Surabaya, Malang and Jombang (overspilling toward 
Pasuruan to the east in recent years) is striking. Nevertheless, 
development in East Java has been more balanced and less dualistic than 
that of the Jakarta-West Java complex. 
Indeed, over recent decades, East Java has probably had the most 
balanced and diversified pattern of economic development of all 
Indonesia's provinces. Agriculture is still the main source of income. 
The province provides a large part of the island's marketed rice supply, 
as well as being a major producer of maize, cassava and soybean. After 
North Sumatra, it is also the main source of plantation crops (see 
below). Moreover, it has Indonesia's second-largest manufacturing 
sector, after Jakarta, ahead of both Central and West Java. No other 
Indonesian province has a comparable range of economic activities, 
although several of the oil-rich or timber-rich provinces can show 
higher levels of regional GDP per capita and higher rates of growth. The 
significant feature of East Java's performance is that it has done so well 
despite the absence of such natural resources (apart from one small off-
shore oil field). 
Another advantage of the 
effective administrative apparatus. 
and inconclusive, but commonly 
province has been an unusually 
The evidence for this is anecdotal 
acknowledged from many quarters. 
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One of the best examples of this was the success of the Family Planning 
program in the 1970s, long before it developed in other parts of the 
country. Another was the success of the provincial government officials 
in gaining acceptance of the Green Revolution by farmers at an early 
stage through the implementation of the Bimas scheme. The level of 
irrigation and the extension of electrification throughout the province 
also testify to the same point. Why that should be the case is hard to 
answer except in terms of a strong pamong praja tradition. 
Rice 
Rice production (and food 
doubled in the fifteen years prior 
new rice technology in the 1970s, 
production more generally) roughly 
to 1984. After a rapid start with the 
East Java had substantially higher rice 
yields than all other provinces by 1980, around six tons per hectare in 
many of the most fertile areas, compared with about four in most of 
Central Java and elsewhere. Other regions have since caught up, while 
East Java has not made much further progress·, which suggests that six 
tons may be a kind of natural limit to productivity increases with 
current technology. But some of the most fertile 'rice baskets' in 
Indonesia are still located here, particularly around Jombang and the 
lower Brantas valley, in the Lumajang-Jember-Banyuwangi area and in 
the Solo valley at Lamongan. 
Plantations 
During the last half-century of colonial rule, East Java was the 
foremost region of plantation enterprise, outpacing West Java and the 
East Coast Residency of Sumatra. Sugar was the main plantation crop, 
followed by coffee, cigar tobacco (in the Besuki-Jember area) and some 
estate rubber. However, little new investment has gone into East Java's 
plantations since the 1930s Depression, apart from some refurbishing of 
the antiquated sugar mills in the 1970s and some replanting of coffee, 
rubber and cocoa trees. The plantation economy is no longer the main 
engine of provincial growth. The dynamism of the rural economy under 
the New Order has come . from quite other sources, from rice 
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intensification, crop diversification and the general commercialisation of 
agriculture. 
The story of the sugar industry is particularly revealing. East Java 
has always produced about 60 per cent of Java's sugar output and still 
has 29 mills. However, productivity levels have declined seriously since 
1941. Mills can no longer obtain access to the most suitable land, as 
farmers have become increasingly reluctant to plant sugar cane at the 
low rents or prices determined by the government, despite coercion 
from the local authorities on behalf of the now state-owned mills 
(nationalised in 1957-8). In 1975 introduction of the smallholder 
cultivation system (Tebu Rakyat Intensifikasi or TRI: Intensified Peasant 
Cane production) was intended to remedy this state of affairs by 
transferring the responsibility for cultivating cane from the mill to the 
peasants. In principle, this has meant a very substantial socio-economic 
change from a plantation-based system of production to a peasant-based 
system. Productivity has declined sharply since the colonial era, 
however, both in cane cultivation and at the factory level. On the other 
hand, the area planted with cane is now greater than it ever was in 
colonial times, roughly 150,000 ha. (and the number of farmers involved 
in sugar cultivation is presumably much greater too), partly because of a 
major technological innovation of the 1970s which has enabled dry land 
(tegalan) to be used for growing cane, whereas only high-quality 
irrigated land (sawah) was previously used. 
The main sugar-growing areas today are the Brantas valley and 
Surabaya residency, the Pasuruan-Probolinggo-Situbondo coastal strip, 
the Lumajang-Jember plain and various areas around Madiun. But cane 
is now grown in many areas which were previously too far from mills to 
be profitable, being trucked over quite long distances sometimes to the 
mill. Sugar cultivation is a very mixed blessing - or a curse - to the 
farmers in East Java, however, due to the distorted cost-price structure 
created by government regulations. The industry has ch an g e d 
considerably since the 1930s and the days when 'sugar was king' in East 
Java have long since passed. But it is still in transition and it is too soon 
to say just what kind of mode of production has replaced the plantation 
system. 
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The other plantation crops (formerly known as bergcultuurs or 
upland estates), of which coffee is by far the most important, have not 
changed so much, except in the unusual case of the Jember cigar tobacco 
industry. The coffee, cocoa and rubber plantations (mostly in the 
Jember-Banyuwangi area, or Madiun, Kediri and Blitar) are still quite 
distinct enclaves, having little impact on the surrounding societies, 
except for some employment creation. The total area under these crops 
is only about half that of sugar cane. And their export value is no longer 
very significant to either the provincial or national economy, although it 
may be important for particular regions, like Jember and Banyuwangi. 
But very little expansion is occurring. The few private estates, mostly 
small, are said to be generally unprofitable. Unlike in the colonial era, 
the traditional plantation crops are no longer a very profitable field of 
investment or significant stimulant to regional development. 
Urbanisation 
The urban population of East Java was about 4. 7 million in 1980, 
nearly 20 per cent of the total population. It was arguably the most 
urbanised province in Indonesia (as it had been in 1971); statistics 
differ on the point. But the rate of increase of urban population (as 
broadly defined) between 1971-80 was relatively slow, only 2. 9 per 
cent per annum, probably because it was growing from a higher base 
figure. However, since the census data do not accurately take into 
account either 'circular migration' or commuting from countryside to the 
towns, those figures probably understate the increase of employment in 
the more rapidly growing urban centres. The regional income statistics 
show very clearly that non-agricultural activities have been growing 
much more rapidly than agricultural ones, presumably because of that 
sort of commuting. 
The number and geographical distribution of East Java's towns 
must have contributed to a good deal of the employment growth and 
income creation of the province in the 1970s, but it is difficult to 
estimate how much. Apart from Surabaya, which ranks ·with Bandung as 
the equal second largest city in Indonesia (approximately two million in 
1980), there are three large_ cities in the range 200-500 thousand 
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inhabitants (Malang, Kediri and Jember), three in the range 90-150 
thousand (Madiun, Probolinggo and Pasuruan), as well as about forty 
others with populations exceeding 20,000. The fact that East Java's 
major towns are quite widely dispersed throughout the province, with a 
very substantial clustering in the central 'golden triangle' area, but also 
half a dozen or so substantial towns located further afield, has meant 
that a good deal of commercial activity has been generated in most parts 
of the province and that the towns have created a relatively high level 
of demand for goods and services, which rural areas generally do not. 
Manufacturing industry 
Surabaya was a centre of manufacturing in the colonial period. 
The metals and machinery sector was especially important, serving the 
sugar industry, railways and both naval and merchant shipping. 
However, industrialisation in East Java lagged behind that of Jakarta-
West Java with the resumption of foreign and domestic investment in 
the late 1960s, although it has expanded rapidly since the oil boom of 
1973-4. In 1985 East Java accounted for 21 per cent of Indonesia's 
manufacturing value added (MV A), compared with 45 per cent for 
Jakarta-West Java and 10 per cent for Central Java. Manufacturing also 
accounted for a third of the provinces' off-farm employment. 
Employment in large and medium industries (over 20 employees) 
doubled between 1974 and 1985 to account for more than a third of 
total manufacturing employment. But it should be noted that by far the 
largest sector in terms of employment and value added was cigarette 
(i.e. kretek - clove cigarettes) fabrication, which for historical reasons is 
heavily concentrated in East Java. Growth of employment was slower in 
the Food and Drink category, partly due to a high initial base, and also in 
Textiles and Clothing, which continues to be a much smaller sector than 
in Central and West Java. East Java has neither a significant batik 
industry like Central Java, nor large weaving and spinning industries 
like West Java. The Household or Cottage Industry sector, which still 
accounts for about half of all manufacturing industry in East Java in 
terms of employment, appears to have grown little between 1974 and 
1985, though 1974 statistics are unreliable. 
In terms of geographic location, 
Medium industry employment is 
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it is noteworthy that Large and 
heavily concentrated along the 
Surabaya-Malang corridor and in Kediri, a major kretek centre with its 
huge Gudam Garam factory, employing over 40,000 workers. 
The growth of Large and Medium manufacturing in East Java has 
been achieved with surprisingly little foreign investment. Only 2 per 
cent of all such enterprises involved foreign investments and the 
amount of foreign capital that was invested in East Java between 1968-
1985 (not all of it in industry, of course) was only about 15 per cent of 
the amount invested in the Jakarta-West Java complex. In other words, 
most of the capital came from domestic investors, some but by no means 
all of it from within the province. 
Further growth of manufacturing industry in East Java can 
probably be expected if the overall level of demand remains buoyant. 
But if it does not, there may be a fall in both output and employment in 
the industrial sector. The consequences for the provincial economy 
would be serious, since this sector has contributed greatly to East Java's 
prosperity over the last twenty years and the further growth of 
manufacturing industry will be crucial if the rapidly increasing work-
force is to find employment in the 1990s. 
Chapter 8 
IRIAN JAVA 
Chris Manning 
Irian Jaya has much in common with other resource-rich outer-
island provinces: they are all relatively sparsely populated, with 
dispersed human settlements, poor communications, high levels of 
reliance on immigrant labour and, despite the outflow of natural 
resource rents to the central government, considerable dependence on 
subsidies from Jakarta for their administrative costs and major 
development programs. But this province has also faced some unique 
problems in generating economic development, while several other 
difficulties have been highly constraining. The latter fall into two 
groups. First, there are substantial barriers to trade and labour 
mobility. These have been imposed, for the most part, by the extremely 
small size of the inland population settlements, which are poorly 
integrated with urban centres and, importantly, the absence of any 
major land or river communications links between 
highlands regions. Second the substantial impact that 
from elsewhere in Indonesia - chiefly from Java and 
has had on indigenous participation in the economic 
the coastal and 
labour migration 
South Sulawesi -
life of urban 
settlements, and more recently in the major transmigration destination 
areas. An almost unique factor in the Irian case, moreover - paralleled 
only in East Timor - is the long and often troubled process of economic, 
administrative and political integration within the Republic. This must 
be viewed against a backdrop of continuing, albeit sporadic, insurgency 
and a preoccupation with security which has touched most aspects of 
economic life in the province. 
Here I propose to review very briefly several aspects of recent 
economic changes in the context of some of these problems. As in other 
provinces in Indonesia, economic growth and social change in Irian Jaya 
has been rapid, fanned in the 1970s and early 1980s by large Central 
Government subsidies flowing from the oil bonanza, and to a much 
lesser extent by Irian's own resources boom. But distributional 
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problems have probably loomed larger here than in most other regions, 
owing to poor intra-provincial economic integration and the dominant 
role which immigrants have come to play in the growing cash economy. 
And Irian's distance from Jakarta, both physical and in a broad sense 
cultural and social, together with the 'security problem', have created 
additional difficulties. The latter relate particularly to poor control of 
administration and, frequently, a lack of sensitivity to specific local 
economic circumstances and challenges. 
Macro economic change and development programs 
Government expenditure on public administration, infrastructure, 
education and health, and transmigration has been the major stimulus to 
economic change in Irian Jaya since the economy was formally absorbed 
into Indonesia after the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969. Although copper 
mining and oil exploitation dominated gross regional domestic product 
(GRDP) from the mid-1970s (over two-thirds in 1980 and around half in 
1984), these developments have had relatively little direct impact on 
the regional economy. A declining share of agriculture in GRDP - 23 per 
cent overall and 44 per cent outside oil and mining in 1984 - can partly 
be attributed to the stagnation of traditional agriculture and export 
crops. But equally important has been the growth in the share of public 
administration to close to 20 per cent of non-oil GRDP in 1984. The 
central government per capita subsidy to the provinces has been high 
by national standards and in the early 1970s compared favourably with 
the Australian government subsidy to PNG. In 1984/85 the subsidy of 
around $50 per capita was very much higher than in the Java provinces 
and had increased more than fourfold in $US terms since the early 
1970s. The net flow of public revenues remained heavily in favour of 
Irian, until the mid 1970s, but was subsequently reversed by the flow 
of substantial revenues deriving from the Mt. Ertzberg copper mine and 
major oil finds in the vicinity of Sorong. Nevertheless, compared with 
some of Indonesia's other resource rich provinces (Riau, East Kalimantan 
and South Sumatra) the net outflow of public revenues from Jayapura 
to Jakarta remains relatively small. 
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Civil service salaries, twice the basic rates prevailing elsewhere in 
Indonesia, absorbed a major share of central government expenditure in 
the early years. Development expenditures have increasingly begun to 
dominate the provincial budget from the mid-1970s. In view of the 
extraordinarily difficult problems of transport and communications in 
Irian, in particular the lack of road links between any of the district 
( k ab up ate n) capitals or between the coast and the highlands, a very 
large share of development revenues - around 60 per cent of the total in 
the early 1970s and 40 per cent a decade later - has gone in to 
improvement of shipping and air links within the province and with the 
rest of Indonesia. Although regular shipping to isolated coastal towns 
remains a major problem, regular liner services from Java and Sulawesi 
to the major towns in Irian have largely overcome the serious shortages 
of basic goods experienced in the early 1970s, thereby re-orienting 
Irian's trade away from its previous high-cost dependence on imports 
and encouraging the rapid inflow of migrants from other regions. 
Increasingly, road transportation has assumed a major share of the 
total expenditure on development, with feeder roads linking the major 
towns to their hinterlands (and especially the new transmigrant 
settlements) and an ambitious plan to link highlands with the coast 
through the construction of a trans-Irian highway assuming a major 
share of the total. Only several hundred kilometres of roads - mainly in 
the border region south of Jayapura and north of Merauke - have been 
completed so far and its impact on widely scattered communities has 
been relatively limited. Despite central government budget cuts, this is 
one project accorded high priority by Jakarta and Jayapura, receiving a 
major share of regional development budget allocations in 1986/87. 
has been the other key area 
around one-third of the total 
Apart from transmigration, education 
of government expenditure, accounting for 
development budget in Irian Jaya since the early 1980s. The largest 
share of this has gone to primary schooling under the national Inpres 
program, almost doubling enrolments since 1970. Although primary 
school enrolments are slightly lower than in most provinces, they were 
reportedly close to universal by the mid 1980s. The Inpres program 
resulted in substantial waste, owing to understaffing of the new schools 
in some areas, and in others severely underutilised facilities owing to 
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rigid application of national building 
needs of small widely dispersed 
blueprints often ill-suited to the 
communities. Nevertheless the 
Indonesian language, already the lingua franca in many parts of Irian 
under the Dutch, has spread widely and the growth in primary schooling 
contributed to communication between groups speaking a wide variety 
of local languages. 
Expansion of secondary and tertiary education has been even more 
rapid, enrolments at both levels growing more than fivefold between 
1970-1985. In 1984, nearly half of all recent primary graduates were 
enrolled in lower secondary school and, although the number of tertiary 
graduates was still small, around 1500 sarjana muda (BA) and 200 
sarjana (MA) having graduated from Cenderawasih University by 1984. 
At least as many sarjana from Irian Jaya have also been trained 
elsewhere in Indonesia. Neither secondary or tertiary graduates faced 
great difficulties in obtaining positions in the rapidly expanding ci vii 
service (including teachers) until quite recently. 
The role of immigrants 
Three immigrant groups - mainly Javanese civil servants, the so-
called BBM (Bugis, Butonese and Makassarese) 'spontaneous' immigrants 
in the towns, and transmigrants 
beneficiaries of the growth in 
domination of new economic 
in hinterland areas -
public expenditure. 
activities and the 
have been major 
The considerable 
spin-offs from 
development programs by these groups has 
public policy in Irian Jaya. 
In the mid 1980s, immigrants made up 
total urban population of around 350,000 -
increase to close to 50 per cent by 1990. 
become a major issue for 
around 40 per cent of the 
a figure which is likely to 
Around 30 per cent of all 
urban immigrants were from Java 
these play a major role in public 
and a considerable proportion of 
service employment. Although 
Irianese depend on expansion of the civil service as the major source of 
wage incomes in the towns, competition from immigrants, even for 
lower level jobs, has continued to limit new openings available to local 
job applicants. The initial justification for employment of i mmi grant 
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civil servants was primarily the shortage of educated and experienced 
Irianese administrators. Despite the provincial government's 
encouragement of employment of Irianese, the predominance of 
informal methods of recruitment (koneksi) has meant that family and 
kin of senior immigrant officials still receive special treatment. Often, 
too, the higher quality of secondary education institutions in Java has 
also given immigrants the edge over local applicants in tests for civil 
service jobs. 
Figures on educational expansion, moreover, considerably overstate 
the contribution of education to indigenous welfare. At upper secondary 
and tertiary levels, in particular, a. high proportion of positions have 
been filled by children born to immigrants and, at the tertiary level, by 
applicants from higher quality schools in Java and other parts of 
Indonesia. As competition for increasingly scarce positions becomes 
more acute, it is likely that tensions between indigenous and immigrant 
job applicants is likely to become more marked. 
At senior levels of government administration it is becoming 
increasingly more difficult to mount the argument of lack of local skilled 
manpower as a reason for the continued presence of personnel from 
outside the province. The current governor, Bas Suebo, is Irianese and 
following Isaac Hindom, the second relatively ind e pendent 1 y- minded 
local appointee. Better educated and more experienced Irianese have 
also begun to fill senior positions in government. But key officers in 
central government departments and lower-level officials - e.g. camat 
(head of subdistrict) - in particular are still mainly recruited from 
outside the province. In the towns, it has been the BBM who have 
dominated new employment opportunities in trade, transport and 
construction and even market gardening. This has occurred despite 
provincial government attempts to encourage employment of Irianese in 
private companies and, more recently, in construction, by offering small 
scale, rapid-turnover projects conducive to the work pattern of Irianese 
villagers. 
Migration of the BBM is relatively recent in nature, occurring largely 
after the 'quarantine' was lifted on Irian Jaya in 1969, and has been the 
major flow of immigrants into Irian Jaya, as well as an important 
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determinant of urban population growth since then. By the mid-1980s, 
the BBM (and also Torajanese from the northern part of South Sulawesi) 
accounted for around half the immigrant population of Irian Jaya and 
20-25 per cent of the total urban population of about 340,000 persons. 
George Adicondro has described how, even among these immigrants, 
most from the poorer areas of central and north South Sulawesi, there is 
considerable specialisation by activity 1 • Butonese and Torajanese 
engaged in fishing and timber activities were prominent among the 
early movers, followed by Buginese traders and poorer Makassarese 
involved in a wide range of low-income self-employed and wage 
activities. In the early 1980s, Makassarese and Butonese had moved 
into wage work 
become engaged 
in the booming construction industry and But ones e 
in market gardening, especially on the outskirts of 
Jayapura. Although many immigrants are concentrated in the Jayapura-
Abepura region and play a more pronounced role in the economy of the 
provincial capital, they have spread widely in the towns throughout 
lrian, in the south in Merauke and Fakfak and also in the highland 
centres such as Wamena. 
Not all immigrants are poor, however. Several large, mainly 
Buginese firms have emerged in recent years, some entrepreneurs 
bringing capital with them and some developing from humble 
beginnings in Irian, providing competition for more established Chinese 
firms in trade and construction activities. Adicondro notes that ten such 
firms, all with total assets of over 1 billion rupiah (about $1 million), 
were in operation in Irian Jaya in late 1985. 
The immigrants have made a major contribution to the growth of 
the regional economy since 1969. The provision of a variety of cheap 
consumer goods, transport, primary products and relatively cheap wage 
labour have all lowered relatively the cost of living in Irian compared 
with Java. Large makeshift markets, of which the Pasar Ampera in 
Jayapura housing several hundred stalls is still the largest, and frequent 
and relatively cheap minor-bus transport within major cities and to 
some nearby urban centres have made a significant contribution to 
1 See George Adicondro, Datang .Dengan Kapan, Tidur di Pasar, Buang Air di Kali 
dan Pulang Dengan Pesawat, YPMD Irian Jaya, Jayapura 1986. 
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living standards of lower-income wage-earners in urban areas. The 
immigrants have also brought new skills to the province, trading 
practices, carpentry skills and new techniques of fishing and farming, 
some of which have been emulated on a limited scale by the local 
population. 
But their presence has also had the effect of severely limiting the 
spread effects of development programs on the employment of Irianese 
in the towns. Contractors prefer to employ what they regard as more 
reliable and hardworking immigrant labour at wage levels which 
although high by Indonesian standards (even after cost of 1 iv in g 
differences are taken into account) are insufficient to attract local 
Irianese labourers away from their traditional farming pursuits. 
Unskilled daily wage rates, ranging from Rp.3,000 to Rp.5,000 in 
Jayapura and a lower Rp.2,000-4,000 in other urban centres, were still 
only about one-half to one-quarter as high as minimum rates in major 
urban centres in PNG (around KIO per day, K49 per week) in 1986. 
It is unlikely that the Indonesian government will reverse its policy 
of free labour movement into Irian Jaya - unrestricted migration being a 
fundamental right throughout the archipelago but strong arguments 
can be made for direct discrimination in the labour market in favour of 
the indigenous population, backed up by greater direct government 
involvement in skills development among the Irianese. Such a move 
would require acknowledgement among politicians and planners in 
Jakarta that there is an argument for treating Irian as a special case in 
national programs and that implementation of such policies is essential 
for maintaining political stability in the region. Such a viewpoint seems 
to be quite widely accepted among senior officials in Jayapura, but there 
is little evidence that Jakarta has changed its basically hands-off 
approach to Irianese participation in the economy over the past fifteen 
years. 
Transmigration to Irian Jaya 
The movement of Javanese to the province only became an issue of 
some controversy after the central government's targeting of Irian as a 
major transmigration area in 1979. Following the movement of over 
20,000 mainly Javanese 
international attention 
families to the 
was especially 
province by the 
drawn to Irian 
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mid-1980s, 
when the 
government announced its intention 
target by more than sixfold and move 
to increase the transmigration 
138,000 households (implying a 
50 per cent increase in the population through transmigration alone) to 
the province over five years, beginning in 1984. Prominent among 
critics, especially of the World Bank's involvement in the program, have 
been groups concerned with the environmental effects of substantial 
movement of people to sparsely populated outer island provinces (see 
especially the Survival International special number on Indonesia's 
transmigration program, April 1986). 
East and Central Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, all relatively 
underpopulated provinces with limited agricultural potential, were 
chosen as the principal new destination areas for transmigrants, 
together accounting for just on half of the total national target for 
Repelita IV. In all regions, success of the program depended on the 
largely unproven capacity of primary and secondary forest areas to 
support an intensive form of sedentary agriculture in locations where 
various forms of swidden farming (combined with hunting and 
gathering activities) had been practised for centuries. 
Thus it might be expected, even more than in the relatively 
accessible transmigration projects of Sumatra (which have received their 
fair share of criticism in the past), many observers would have been 
sceptical concerning the economic viability and the potential damaging 
effect on the environment of the new transmigration settlements in 
Irian. In the early years of the new settlements these fears were borne 
out as the farmers, aided by considerable government support - a large 
share of local agricultural support and extension efforts in Irian Jaya 
have gone into the transmigration sites - struggled to make a success of 
new crops. 
The worst problems appear to have been in the southern plains 
regions near Merauke, where rice strains and the planting cycle 
introduced from Java were unable to cope with the long dry season and 
substantial flooding during the wet period, major transport prob 1 ems 
affected marketing as the lar.ge areas became a swampland during the 
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wet season, and rats and wallabies caused severe damage to successive 
rice crops. In both Merauke and Sorong in the west (which together 
with Jayapura on the north coast, accounted for just on 80 per cent of all 
transmigrants moved to Irian Jaya over the period 1979-86) it was only 
after 3-5 years that many of the settlements achieved reasonable rice 
yields ie. 4-5 tons of dry stalk padi (unhusked rice) per hectare. 
Nevertheless several of these settlements are now established on a 
relatively sound footing. Incomes earned from major staple crops or 
rice and corn are supported by a variety of vegetables and fruits grown 
on the 0.25 ha. housegardens and, for some households, by off-farm 
trade, food processing eg. tahu (soya bean curd) and tempe (fermented 
soya bean cake), repair activities and seasonal wage labour. As special 
surveys of transmigration in various regions of Indonesia suggest, the 
net incomes of the majority · of transmigrants are probably not much 
above the poverty line. But their situation has probably improved 
compared with conditions of the poor, landless households in their 
regions of origin. 
Indigenous economic welfare 
Government expenditures have had the greatest 
major towns along the north coast and especially in the 
capital of Jayapura. Irianese have benefitted from the 
impact in the 
rapidly growing 
availability of 
cheaper consumer goods from Java and Sulawesi and some village 
people from greater access to urban areas offering prospects of wage 
work, a wide range of goods offered in the bustling night markets and 
various forms of entertainment relatively rare in the major towns a 
decade or so before. As elsewhere in Indonesia the middle class, 
consisting mainly of those with jobs in government, have done 
particularly well . Although official salaries are lower than those earned 
by counterparts across the border, this is to some extent compensated 
by the low cost of living, generous subsidies to housing and transport, 
luxury items such as television (the planned introduction of the latter is 
still a matter of controversy in PNG), and the range of services, frequent 
public transport, servants, etc ., available to the middle class in most 
Indonesian cities . 
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The impact of government expenditures on indigenous economic 
activity and welfare has been much less marked in rural areas beyond 
the small hinterland settlements providing agricultural produce to urban 
areas. The failure of early 'civilizing' mission activities typified in the 
operasi koteka program to clothe highlanders and attempts to introduce 
'modern' style houses to replace the traditional hon i houses has 
way to a more realistic approach which views generation of 
incomes and attitudinal changes through the spread of education as 
given 
cash 
the 
life major 
styles. 
channels for affecting change towards more 'Indonesian' 
Several thousand kilometres of simple village roads in the highlands 
have facilitated administration and the extension of government 
services - education and health in particular. Both mission and NGO 
organisations have been involved in intensive efforts to provide simple 
skills, productive equipment and inputs through credit programs, and 
improved living conditions (more accessible water supply, improved 
health care practises and greater attention to environmental control) in 
many small communities. 
But most rural people have experienced little change in patterns of 
economic life over the past 15 years. For most villagers significant 
increases in incomes depend on either the opening up of trade links with 
the rest of Indonesia or abroad, or obtaining access to cash incomes 
through wage employment. The overwhelming emphasis on food crops, 
chiefly rice and vegetables, produced under government programs, 
mostly concentrated in and around the new transmigration settlements, 
has contributed to relative neglect of smallholder tree crop exports -
copra, maize, nutmeg, cocoa, coffee and rubber - all potentially major 
sources of cash income for villagers from stands which had already been 
established in the later years of Dutch control. 
Some efforts have been made to rehabilitate old stands and 
introduce new crops; for instance, cocoa, coffee and cloves, which all 
seem · to have a bright future . Inadequate extension and irregular, costly 
transport systems, especially river transport in the south, have me ant 
that traditional exports (valued at less than $1 million in 1985) have 
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lagged far behind those in most other outer-island provinces. They have 
also lagged far behind PNG's exports, where smallholder and plantation 
tree crops have for several decades provided a major source of cash 
income for village people, especially in the highlands. 
Poor communications and, more importantly, immigrant domination 
of wage activities in the towns have largely closed off the option of 
temporary migration to urban areas as a means of generating cash 
income for rural development for a large proportion of the village 
people, a process which has been extremely important for rural 
modernisation in many other parts of Indonesia and in the highlands of 
PNG. It seems clear that if incomes . are to be raised significantly for the 
majority of Irianese, the government will have to re-evaluate the 
implications for rural change, of rapid economic integration with the rest 
of Indonesia in a unique physical environment that has severely limited 
the possibilities of commercial development in the past. 
The provincial government has welcomed the transmigration 
program as a vehicle for providing cheaper agricultural produce for the 
towns, as a justification for costly investments in infrastructure, 
especially roads, which are also needed to encourage commercial 
activities in rural areas, and as means of introducing new patterns of 
farming to the indigenous population. The two former objectives have 
to some extent been met, although the desirability of emphasis on rice 
production in most communities established to the early 1980s is now 
seriously questioned, while the manifold problems of establishing viable 
economic units in many new transmigrant sites has been extremely 
costly. Moreover, the land issue appears to have been more sensitive in 
Irian than in other provinces and the positive spread effects of the new 
settlements on local agricultural practises and incomes relatively small. 
The flow-on of benefits from the transmigration settlements to the 
local population has been an issue of controversy. Irianese have 
certainly gained from the new roads providing access from the 
transmigration areas and surrounding villages to major towns; likewise, 
the schools and health centres established in the centres are frequently 
utilised by residents living nearby. But potential benefits from the new 
roads, in particular, have not been realised, largely due to immigrant 
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domination of new economic activities in the towns. Much of the 
construction work in the transmigration areas has 
by teams of contract workers from outside the 
Butonese and Makassarese from Sulawesi. 
also been conducted 
province, especially 
It has been hoped that new farming techniques introduced by 
transmigrants might spread to local people, chiefly through the direct 
participation of the latter in the new settlements. To this end, the 
government has since 1982 reserved 25 per cent of all places in the 
sites to local transmigrants (in contrast to 10 per cent of places reserved 
for locals in other provinces). The impact of this policy on encouraging 
commercial agriculture among the indigenous population has been 
disappointing, however. In some regions, most notably in the south 
around Merauke, few of the local population have been attracted by the 
offer of new housing and individually owned land (only 3 per cent of all 
transmigrants being recruited locally in Merauke between 1982-1986). 
In other regions in Irian there appears to have been little problem 
in finding local people to join the transmigration settlements. But many 
of the indigenous people who did join rarely lived in their new houses or 
cultivated the new land allocated to them, preferring rather to live in 
their original villages and continue their traditional agricultural 
practises. Membership of the new communities was valuable mainly in 
offering to bestow private land ownership (in contrast to traditional 
communal rights), a valuable asset for any individuals interested in 
borrowing through the banking system. Irianese appear to have been 
reluctant to play an active role in the new settlements, partly because of 
the high level of risk attached to the new farming systems, with their 
requirements of much larger and more regular labour inputs compared 
with traditional sago gathering, fishing and hunting activities. The 
predominance of Javanese cultural practises and language, several major 
outbreaks of malaria and housing designs ill-suited to intermittent 
flooding in some locations have also discouraged active 1oca1 
participation in the new settlements. One alternative at present being 
tried by the provincial government is the provision of benefits to the 
nearby Irianese villages similar to those given to the transmigrants, thus 
encouraging the latter to remain in their traditional environment rather 
than · trying to move them to · unfamiliar locations. 
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The major area of conflict with the indigenous population has 
inevitably been over the issue of compensation for land acquired for the 
transmigrants. Several local chiefs, ondoafi, have handed over land for 
transmigration in the hope of benefitting from the new investment in 
their area. But many have subsequently felt cheated by the government 
because of disputes over appropriate compensation payments for 
economic losses experienced by the local people (loss of hunting and 
fishing opportunities, or access to timber products, or not being regarded 
as eligible for compensation by the government), or because of failures 
by government officials to honour initial agreements concerning 
compensation. Illegal sales of timber and timber products by building 
contractors working on and around. the new transmigration sites have 
also added to the ire of local leaders. 
Conflicts appear to have been most severe in the vicinity of 
Jayapura, where awareness of indigenous rights is much stronger than 
elsewhere in Irian and the issue of land acquisition by immigrants a 
major source of social and political conflict. The recent opening of the 
legal aid service (LBH) in Irian, with the objective of concentrating 
almost entirely on the land issue, may help to draw attention to some of 
these abuses. 
Because of the much lower costs of production of 
goods in the low-wage population centres elsewhere 
development planners have seen the 
industries as having major potential 
generation in Irian Jaya. The record 
expansion of 
for employment 
here has been 
most consumer 
in Indonesia, 
resource-based 
and income 
disappointing, 
however. The copper mine, oil prospecting and large-scale exploitation 
of fish and timber resources have provided direct employment for only 
about 10,000 persons overall, a tiny fraction of the total work force, 
while the enclave and export nature of these ventures has resulted in 
minimal spread effects across the local economy. 
Sorong on the western tip of the island has been targeted as a major 
commercial centre in Eastern Indonesia. But the major nickel project on 
nearby Gag island failed to materialise, owing to uneconomically low 
nickel prices, while the processing of the rich fish resources of the area 
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has been limited to cold storage operations for prawn and tuna exports. 
Moreover, the future of the oil industry is uncertain in light of the 
recent decline in international oil prices. 
Hopes for the timber industry have also not been realised. Because 
the stands in Irian Jaya are less valuable commercially than those in 
Kalimantan and Maluku, investors only began to turn their attention to 
Irian in the late 1970s. There was a flurry of domestic investment in 
logging, mainly Jakarta-based, for several years - most notorious in the 
southern Asmat region for the illegal subcontracting arrangements made 
with the local population, pitifully low payments and coercion on the 
part of the local officials working with timber companies. But not one of 
the firms established major processing units; then the implementation of 
the ban on log exports in 1985 saw a withdrawal of most firms from the 
region (including a major Korean firm, ostensibly because of threats 
from the OPM), while remaining investors chose to process their timber 
through plywood mills established elsewhere in Indonesia, most notably 
two large plants in Ceram. 
Conclusion 
Despite its rapid economic growth rates similar to those experienced 
elsewhere in Indonesia during the 1970s and early 1980s, development 
programs in Irian Jaya have been disappointing in either furthering the 
objective of raising indigenous welfare or providing for greater Irianese 
participation in the regional and national economies. Nevertheless the 
picture is certainly not as dismal as opponents of continued Indonesian 
control of the region have frequently claimed. The appointment of a 
new governor, Bas Suebo, a younger and more dynamic leader than his 
predecessor, with strong views regarding the need for greater Irianese 
participation in the economy, and of August Kafir as the first Irianese 
Rector of Cenderawasih University, are welcome signs of greater Jakarta 
attention to issues of indigenous participation in economic life. Irianese 
appear to exercise greater effective power in key positions in the 
bureaucracy than they did a decade or so ago. Expansion of the civil 
service has provided jobs for the growing number of educated Irianese 
graduates, while the extension of infrastructure, primary education, 
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health services and a range of small scale NGO and mission community 
development programs have all had an impact on the welfare of rural 
people. 
The 
1986/87 
drastic cutback in the national transmigration budget 
and 1987 /88 can only help to reduce the tensions which 
for 
too 
rapid movement of sponsored migrants into rural areas had begun to 
create. But budget cuts will also significantly affect the growth in lrian, 
owing to the very crucial role which government expenditure has played 
in economic change in this province. The case, made by several Jakarta 
intellectuals and by many mission and NGO organisations, senior officials 
and academics in Jayapura, for a . special approach to development in 
Irian would seem to be even stronger now. This would stress greater 
attention to Irianese employment and participation in the economy and 
programs of rural development that are designed to meet the region's 
unique patterns of human settlement and economic behaviour. The 
repressive actions of local officials and the military especially in the 
border regions were an important factor behind the very substantial 
1984 border crossings. The latter have, however, been a powerful 
reminder of the political implications of failure to meet the aspirations 
of a growing Irianese middle class, hence of the necessity to plan and 
implement development programs that are better suited to the needs of 
the majority of the indigenous population, if such incidents are to be 
avoided in future. 
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